Choosing the next Dalai Lama

Dalai Lama: Tibetans To Vote On New Leadership – November 28, 2007 – The New York Sun

The Tibetan desire for autonomy vs. the Chinese position that Tibet will always be considered part of China would get my vote as one of the best best battles to study in terms of Quality Leadership and strategy.

AMRITSAR, India The Dalai Lama said yesterday the Tibetan people will vote on a new system of leadership before he dies, as Tibetan Buddhists grapple with ways to prevent their spiritual leaders from falling under Chinese control.

China has ruled the Himalayan nation of Tibet with a heavy hand since its communist-led forces invaded in 1951 and for decades, the Dalai Lama has personified Tibetans’ struggle for self-determination. But fears that China will appoint a new Dalai Lama after his death have led Tibetan leaders to contemplate ideas that break with the centuries-old system to choose their spiritual leader including doing away with Dalai Lamas or naming a successor before the current leader dies. China, which accuses the Dalai Lama of seeking independence for Tibet, angrily condemned the Nobel Peace Prize winner’s proposal as a subversion of Buddhist tradition.

System Improvement: Guard and Reserve

Gates: Review Military’s Role In Homeland Defense, (Washingtonpost.com)…Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press
Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday ordered his top department leaders to conduct a broad review to determine whether the military, National Guard and Reserve can adequately deal with domestic disasters and whether they have the training and equipment to defend the homeland.

Gates: Active Force, Reserves Must Integrate, (ArmyTimes.com)…William H. McMichael
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates took a giant step Monday toward more tightly blending the active-duty military and reserve components into an “integrated total force,” calling for wide-ranging personnel policy changes, codifying the reserves’ homeland defense role and adequately funding

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves – Report

Afghanistan: Adaptibility

One Surge Does Not Fit All, (New York Times)…Donald H. Rumsfeld

THE surge in Iraq has been one of the most impressive military accomplishments in recent years. It has been so successful that the emerging consensus is that what may now be needed in Afghanistan is a similar surge of American forces.

In a few weeks, the new commander in chief, Barack Obama, will assume the responsibility of leading a nation at a time of war. Time and flexibility are the two constants of military success. In a struggle with an adaptable, thinking enemy, there is no single template for success. More is not always better. One size does not fit all.

The singular trait of the American way of war is the remarkable ability of our military to advance, absorb setbacks, adapt and ultimately triumph based upon the unique circumstances of a given campaign. Thus it has been throughout our history. And thus it will be in Iraq and Afghanistan, if we have the patience and wisdom to learn from our successes, and if our leaders have the wherewithal to persevere even when it is not popular to do so.

Donald H. Rumsfeld was the secretary of defense from 2001 to 2006.

Global Trends 2025 – Report

POST: Disappointing NIC report, Thomas P.M. Barnett on November 22, 2008

ARTICLE: US global dominance ‘set to wane’, BBC, 21 November 2008

REPORT: GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL’S 2025 PROJECT, NIC, November 2008

Disappointing to see the NIC default to resource wars as a generalized bit of futures fear-mongering. It’s just so unimaginative and reflects the NIC talking to a lot of stale academics who trot out their analogies to 19th-century colonialism and balance-of-power politics while completely discounting the profound economic–and especially financial–interdependence (the latter currently on display big time).

Not very helpful in terms of preparing people for the real dynamics ahead.

Natl Security Policy – Realists

Scowcroft Proteges On Obama’s Radar, (Wall Street Journal)…Yochi J. Dreazen and Siobhan Gorman, Nov 24, 2008.

Many of the Republicans emerging as potential members of the Obama administration have professional and ideological ties to Brent Scowcroft, a former national-security adviser turned public critic of the Bush White House.

Mr. Scowcroft’s re-emergence caps a tumultuous few years for the 83-year-old former Air Force general. In the run-up to the Iraq war, Mr. Scowcroft wrote an opinion column in The Wall Street Journal arguing against an invasion and warning that it would “seriously jeopardize, if not destroy” the Bush administration’s war on terrorism. In speeches and interviews, he regularly criticized both the decision to invade Iraq and the Bush team’s handling of the war effort.

The White House responded by removing Mr. Scowcroft from his position as chairman of a foreign intelligence advisory board. Defenders of the Bush policy say the president has planted the seeds of democracy in the Middle East and preserved strong ties with Israel, which had a tense relationship with the elder President Bush when Mr. Scowcroft was national-security adviser.

Global Trends 2025

Panel Foresees Lesser U.S. Role(Washington Times)…Nicholas Kralev, Nov 19, 2008.

The top U.S. intelligence panel this week is expected to issue a snapshot of the world in 2025, in a report that predicts fading American economic and military dominance and warns of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

The NIC report, a draft copy of which is titled “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” is slated for release as early as Thursday.

Strategy for the long haul

Obama Administration Faces Hard Choices In Managing Ground Troops, (GovExec.com)…Katherine McIntire Peters, Nov 17, 2008.

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments on Monday released three new reports aimed at informing the next administration as it makes difficult decisions in shaping a new military strategy.

The nonpartisan center’s analysts laid out detailed accounts of the recruiting, equipping and organizational challenges confronting the ground services and recommended the Obama administration cut some weapons programs, reorganize special operations forces and reconsider plans to substantially increase the size of the Army.

The reports were the latest installments in the center’s “Strategy for the Long Haul,” a comprehensive look at how the services are poised to face the most likely strategic challenges in the coming years. The 15-volume collection of monographs seeks to inform the Pentagon’s upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, which will get under way in early 2009, as well as guide the Obama administration.

Afghanistan Strategy: Larger Security Force

How To Win In Afghanistan, (Wall Street Journal)…Michael O’Hanlon, Nov 14, 2008.

…So why build a large Afghan security force? The answer is simple: because the alternatives are worse. One possibility is to increase the number of NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan, pushing the combined cost of the operation well above the current $4 billion a month. The other possibility is most likely to lose the war.

The United States has been spending nearly $3 billion a year to fund the Afghanistan security forces of late. This is a great deal of money but far less than our own military costs in that country. We should be willing to double that $3 billion a year if need be. The added expenses need not stay high indefinitely. Once Afghanistan’s security forces have their needed equipment, and provided President Obama can cajole and pressure other major countries to foot their share of the bill, American security aid requirements should drop back to current levels.

Writing in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, two notable South Asia scholars asked whether the American political system was reliable enough to commit such funds to an enlarged Afghan security force over an extended period. The answer is yes. We have proven as much over the years in funding Korea and Taiwan, Greece and Turkey, and for the last three decades Egypt and Israel, when our core security interests dictated it. Certainly Afghanistan, where al Qaeda once had its main home — and where over 20 American GIs as well as another 10 foreign troops a month have been losing their lives, carrying out a mission that Afghans themselves are not yet ready to lead — is worth a comparable financial investment.

Winning the Peace

Stability Operations and State Building: Continuities and Contingencies. Edited by Colonel Greg Kaufmann, U.S.A., Ret, September, 2008. Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA.

The Strategic Studies Institute and Austin Peay State University conducted an academic colloquium titled, “Stability Operations
and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies.” The purpose was to identify principles and supporting policies of state-building that will enhance America’s ability “to win the peace” while stabilizing chaotic regions. The approved list of “Principles to Win the Peace” were:

1. Ensure rule of law
2. Seek security: civil, military, economic
3. Pursue legitimacy
4. Encourage development
5. Foster self-empowerment and self-sufficiency
6. Foster communications

Thomas Barnett was one of the presenters. His session titled: How America Realigns Itself to the Current Geostrategic Landscape, identifed the following points of emphasis:

• Leave the place more connected than you found it, across all networks possible.
• romote industries that link the economy into existing and emergent production chains; any niche will do.
• Give the regime the technical and training wherewithal to secure its borders.
• Rehabilitate and/or build up air- and seaport security to meet American entry/fastpass standards, so that direct connections can be forged, giving transitioning states the software and hardware if necessary.
• Go slowly on elections and demands for democracy; most countries can only connect as single-party regimes because of the social and economic challenges involved with opening up to the global economy.
• Realize most societies have democracy within tribes and among tribal leaders, but that the decision point preference is consensus, not majority vote.
• Go with whatever traditional social hierarchal structure exists; build from that instead of transplanting.
• Do not push women’s rights so much as women’s education—especially for girls. (Remember how long it took for women to get the vote in the United States.)
• Do not feed people except for short durations and when extreme need arises; it is better to encourage agricultural development.
• Build police, not militaries.

In a previous posting, Economics, Political Change, Prediction Markets, I reference Barnett’s work in expanding economic connectivity through gloablization. His points of emphasis above reinforce the need for “phased-in variability” regarding change … go slowly on elections, concensus vs. majority vote, focus on women’s education vs women rights, build on existing instead of transplanting.

Strategic Shocks

Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development. Nathan P. Freier , Nov 2008, Strategic Studies Institute.

Historically, defense strategy demonstrates three flaws: (1) it is generally reactive, (2) it lacks sufficient strategic imagination, and (3) as a result, it is vulnerable to surprise. The current administration confronted a game-changing “strategic shock” in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same kind of unconventional and nonmilitary shock to DoD convention early in its first term.