Inside The Ring, By Bill Gertz, Washington Times, January 15, 2009

A military analyst in Afghanistan has identified 2009 as a critical year for U.S. and allied counterinsurgency efforts against the Taliban and al Qaeda. The analyst, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue, told Inside the Ring that U.S. actions this year will either start the beginning of success or a shift toward “a tipping point toward failure.”

“From a security perspective, the insurgents have grown more powerful and capable due to their safe havens in Pakistan; [improvised explosive device] attacks have increased and caused many coalition casualties but have killed more Afghans than anyone,” the officer said.

According to the officer, who is well-versed in events throughout the region, the year is likely to see some political gains for the government in Kabul but more combat, as well. “Many areas that appear quiet are only so because the insurgency has roots there as well,” said the officer. “The introduction of more U.S. forces will kick the beehives.”

U.S. officials including Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have also warned that the U.S. is not winning in Afghanistan. The officer said some of the problems involve a lack of support from NATO allies, a continued overemphasis on Iraq and an insufficient number of advisers and trainers for Afghan security forces.

For example, he said, the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan has less than 60 percent of the forces needed to develop the Afghan security forces. He said that the Central Command-led U.S. Forces Afghanistan are short about 50 percent of the troops and forces it needs, as the military prepares to double the force with the addition of about 12,000 troops this year.

He said the unfolding U.S. counterinsurgency strategy this year will follow four main elements:

*Expanding, training and equipping Afghan military and police forces to provide security.

*Developing good governance and rule of law.

*Creating a sustainable market economy.

*Developing a free press and nationwide communications and media system to reach local communities to defeat insurgent propaganda and highlight Afghan success stories.

Another major problem to date has been a lack of integrated planning for these soft-power elements. The result has been “stovepipe efforts that do not achieve full and efficient results and effects in areas of operation,” the officer said.

He said the focus also has to be on Pakistan and its tribal areas, which have been a haven for militants.

“We cannot win in Afghanistan without a regional strategy and without Pakistan’s full renunciation and support to terrorism and terrorist groups,” the officer said.

Pakistani military operations in the North West Frontier and Federally Administered Tribal Areas have been helpful so far but need to be stepped up, he said.

“The same tribal, governance and development problems on the Afghan side of the border are mirrored across the border in Pakistan.”

“We are competing against a thousand years of culture but one that can change as trust and confidence grows in the hearts of each Afghani.”

The keys to success in Afghanistan are to continue efforts to put Afghans in the lead, and embed U.S. and NATO advisers in Afghan combat units’ tactical to operational levels, he said.

Additionally, he said, more combat power is needed on the ground for both coalition and Afghan forces, and substantially more development resources and funds are needed.