Inside The Ring, By Bill Gertz, Washington Times, January 15, 2009

A military analyst in Afghanistan has identified 2009 as a critical year for U.S. and allied counterinsurgency efforts against the Taliban and al Qaeda. The analyst, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue, told Inside the Ring that U.S. actions this year will either start the beginning of success or a shift toward “a tipping point toward failure.”

“From a security perspective, the insurgents have grown more powerful and capable due to their safe havens in Pakistan; [improvised explosive device] attacks have increased and caused many coalition casualties but have killed more Afghans than anyone,” the officer said.

According to the officer, who is well-versed in events throughout the region, the year is likely to see some political gains for the government in Kabul but more combat, as well. “Many areas that appear quiet are only so because the insurgency has roots there as well,” said the officer. “The introduction of more U.S. forces will kick the beehives.”

U.S. officials including Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have also warned that the U.S. is not winning in Afghanistan. The officer said some of the problems involve a lack of support from NATO allies, a continued overemphasis on Iraq and an insufficient number of advisers and trainers for Afghan security forces.

For example, he said, the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan has less than 60 percent of the forces needed to develop the Afghan security forces. He said that the Central Command-led U.S. Forces Afghanistan are short about 50 percent of the troops and forces it needs, as the military prepares to double the force with the addition of about 12,000 troops this year.

He said the unfolding U.S. counterinsurgency strategy this year will follow four main elements:

*Expanding, training and equipping Afghan military and police forces to provide security.

*Developing good governance and rule of law.

*Creating a sustainable market economy.

*Developing a free press and nationwide communications and media system to reach local communities to defeat insurgent propaganda and highlight Afghan success stories.

Another major problem to date has been a lack of integrated planning for these soft-power elements. The result has been “stovepipe efforts that do not achieve full and efficient results and effects in areas of operation,” the officer said.

He said the focus also has to be on Pakistan and its tribal areas, which have been a haven for militants.

“We cannot win in Afghanistan without a regional strategy and without Pakistan’s full renunciation and support to terrorism and terrorist groups,” the officer said.

Pakistani military operations in the North West Frontier and Federally Administered Tribal Areas have been helpful so far but need to be stepped up, he said.

“The same tribal, governance and development problems on the Afghan side of the border are mirrored across the border in Pakistan.”

“We are competing against a thousand years of culture but one that can change as trust and confidence grows in the hearts of each Afghani.”

The keys to success in Afghanistan are to continue efforts to put Afghans in the lead, and embed U.S. and NATO advisers in Afghan combat units’ tactical to operational levels, he said.

Additionally, he said, more combat power is needed on the ground for both coalition and Afghan forces, and substantially more development resources and funds are needed.

Report: US Had Unrealistic Goals In Afghanistan, (Washingtonpost.com)…Anne Gearan, Associated Press

…The incoming Obama administration should refocus the U.S. war and rebuilding effort in Afghanistan and think of the project as the work of at least a decade, according to the report compiled by the United States Institute of Peace. The assessment was set for release Thursday at a conference to be attended by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen and Army Gen. David Petraeus, who is in charge of the Afghan and Iraq wars.

The U.S. military is preparing to pour at least 20,000 extra troops into southern Afghanistan to cope with a Taliban insurgency that is fiercer than NATO leaders expected. The new troops will augment the 12,500 NATO soldiers — mainly British, Canadian and Dutch — in what amounts to an Afghan version of the surge in Iraq.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said the U.S. can expect to commit significant numbers of soldiers there for several more years. Gates said he will not have to cut troop levels further in Iraq to free up at least two of those three brigades for Afghan duty.

When the additions are complete, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan will climb to more than 50,000. Some 31,000 U.S. troops are there now.

Taliban Taunts US Over 30,000 Extra Troops, (London Daily Telegraph)…Ben Farmer, Dec 22, 2008.

Plans to double the number of US troops in Afghanistan will see them suffer the same defeat as the Soviet army, the Taliban claims.

Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Washington could send up to 30,000 more troops over the next six months. The senior US commander in the country, General David McKiernan, had previously asked for more than 20,000 soldiers to counter the increasingly violent Taliban insurgency.

But Yousuf Ahmadi, a Taliban spokesman claiming to represent the fugitive leader Mullah Omar, said: “Russians also sent that many troops but were badly defeated.

“When the US increases its troop levels to that of the Russians, they will also be cruelly defeated.”

He added: “More troops – that means there will be more targets for the Taliban.”

Soviet forces lost 15,000 men in bitter fighting with US-backed Afghan resistance movements during their 10-year occupation of the country and withdrew in 1988.

The US reinforcements are due to arrive in the country in January and be deployed in the provinces of Logar and Wardak, on the southern flank of Kabul.

The insurgency of Islamist fighters has encroached on the capital this year, cutting several routes out of the city for westerners and aid agencies.

The Afghan government welcomed the prospect of more US troops, but said they should be used to train the Afghan Army and block the flow of insurgents from Pakistan’s tribal regions.

Sultan Ahmad Baheen, a foreign ministry spokesman, said: “These forces should be deployed in places where they are needed – particularly in Helmand and along our eastern borders, from where terrorists infiltrate into our country.”

Other US reinforcements are due to join British troops in Helmand, where commanders have described the insurgency as a “stalemate”.

Afghanistan, The Next Surge, Can more American troops and a new strategy beat the Taliban? The Economist, December 19, 2008

KABUL — A surge of American troops and a rethinking of tactics worked in Iraq. Can the same be done for the troubled mission in Afghanistan? As America draws down in Iraq, it is sending over 20,000 more troops to Afghanistan. A new strategy is also beginning to emerge after months of high-level consultations, and is due to be unveiled in the coming weeks by the Afghan government and the United Nations.

According to officers in the NATO-led force, the first priority will be to reclaim the ring-road, Afghanistan’s main artery, around which the main population centres are concentrated. This route was rebuilt with Western aid after the toppling of the Taliban, but has become increasingly dangerous. The sections south of the capital, Kabul, are largely cut off by Taliban insurgents and criminal gangs.

With more Western troops, and the training of a greater number of Afghan security forces, another aim will be to strengthen areas where the government is in danger of losing control. Forty such districts will be the target of a comprehensive military and political effort to stop them from falling into Taliban hands. A pilot scheme involving the first five of these so-called “critical districts” is due to be set up soon.

Tribal powerbrokers in these areas will be invited to agree to a “contract”. The government, backed by international forces, will undertake to provide security, bring economic development and give each tribal council or shura (whose members will be paid by the government) a greater say in the running of local affairs. In return, the tribes will promise to expel and deter insurgents, and to provide recruits (probably about 50 per district) for a local force that would perform guard duties.

This has echoes of the “Sons of Iraq” militia that the Americans created in Iraq as part of their successful “surge”. It is also akin to the Arbakai, tribal forces that historically operated in parts of Afghanistan.

Many elements of this strategy have been tried before; the Arbakai concept was proposed a year ago by Britain’s prime minister, Gordon Brown, but made little progress. This time around, disparate initiatives will be joined into a single package. The greater number of forces should make the promise of security more credible, and the Afghan government and the UN will be placed at the forefront of the process.

Will it work or will it, like many other initiatives, collapse amid the perennial feuding and corruption of Afghan tribal politics? President Hamid Karzai has lost popularity, and the quality of most of the police and district officials is woeful.

The Afghan army has been built up with some success. But attempts to improve the police have been unpromising. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police, a local force to be raised by tribal elders, was scrapped this year when it turned out to be a divisive ragtag militia, often biased towards a particular tribe and packed with drug addicts and petty criminals.

Another attempt at reform has been the so-called “focused district development” in which all policemen from a district are taken out for an eight-week training course, re-equipped, and sent back with American soldiers acting as “mentors”. The mentors were supposed to withdraw after a few months, but a year into the programme they have yet not felt able to leave their Afghan charges. NATO says there is a shortfall of about 2,300 mentors.

Afghan and Western officials working in the provinces agree that, if the new approach is to work, the right choice of shura members will be crucial. But maintaining these bodies will not be cheap for the Kabul government; the proposed wage for members has already been cut from $200 to $120 a month.

Balancing local factions is notoriously difficult. “The government is weak and people are losing faith,” says Haji Bidar Zazai, an MP from Ali Khail, a proposed “critical district” in Paktia. “We have eight tribes in our district but if a shura is not representative of all eight it will never work.”

Relying on tribal structures may work best in the south-east of the country, where the tribes are comparatively stable and cohesive. In the south, however, tribal structures are weaker, warlords tend to dominate and insurgents exploit tribal rivalries. In Iraq, the Sunni tribes were vital to success; in Afghanistan, tribal rivalries may undo the best-laid plans.