Category: Strategery

PBS Interview: Secretary Gates on Policy

Interview With Defense Secretary Gates, (PBS)…Charlie Rose, Dec 17, 2008.

In a Wednesday night interview, Defense Secretary Gates discusses several topics, including how national security policy may change in the Obama administration, and events in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES: My biggest concern in Afghanistan is the history of foreign armies in Afghanistan going back to Alexander the Great. As long as the Afghan people see us as their friend and ally, as long as they see us as in this fight for them, as well as for ourselves, then I think we’ll be okay. But if we get too many forces in there, if they come to see us as in it for only ourselves and not as their ally and they turn against us, then I think we cannot be successful.

He has argued for a U.S. military that better integrates diplomacy and soft power with hard power. Under his watch, Iraq has become a more stable place, a new U.S.-Iraq security agreement requires U.S. combat troops to withdraw by the end of 2011, but the war in Afghanistan has intensified. 

New Paradigm Needed: Grand Strategy

Strategy at any level can be defined as the assimilation of ends (interests) ways (policies/methods), and means (resources). Developmet of a grand strategy should also align strategies at the strategic (long-term), operational (mid-term) and tactical (short-term) levels. Next challenge is deployment which requires a common framework among the key stakeholders.  The fact that the topic is even addressed indicates the need for a strategy for developing strategy. 

Wanted: A New Grand Strategy, By Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek, Nov 29, 2008,   

Grand strategy sounds like an abstract concept—something academics discuss—and one that bears little relationship to urgent, jarring events on the ground. But in the absence of strategy, any administration will be driven by the news, reacting rather than leading. For a superpower that has global interests and is forced to respond to virtually every problem, it’s all too easy for the urgent to drive out the important.

Strategy begins by looking at the world and identifying America’s interests, the threats to them and the resources available to be deployed. By relating all these, one can develop a set of foreign policies that will advance America’s interests and ideals. When the unexpected happens, one can respond in ways that are aligned with these broader objectives. One uses the urgent to pursue the important. Or, to put it another way: never let a crisis go to waste.

Pakistan, India, Afghanistan: Scenario

Opinion: Plans Of Attack, (Washington Post)…Richard A. Clarke

…To most of the world, the Mumbai massacre seems inexplicable and random, like the periodic devastation caused by typhoons or tornadoes, or simply pointless, just killing for killing’s sake. But the attack was neither random nor pointless. The carnage in Mumbai was goal-oriented, an attempt to advance an overall strategy that is being ruthlessly pursued by the Islamist radical network.

Seven years after 9/11, the United States has neither eliminated the threat from al-Qaeda nor secured Afghanistan, where bin Laden’s terrorists were once headquartered. To accomplish these two tasks, we must now eliminate the new terrorist safe haven in Pakistan. But that will require effective action from a weak and riven Pakistani government. It might also depend upon dealing with the long-standing India-Pakistan rivalry. On balance, al-Qaeda’s agenda for 2009 looks to be the easier one.

Richard A. Clarke served as White House counterterrorism coordinator under presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. His most recent book is “Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters.”

Natl Defense Strategy: Balance

Note that Secretary of Defense Gates is referencing “Defense” strategy – a balanced concept is also needed for the National Security Strategy that would more effectively integrate the “whole-of-government” approach.

ESSAY: A Balanced Strategy, Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, Robert M. Gates From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009

The defining principle of the Pentagon’s new National Defense Strategy is balance. The United States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.

The strategy strives for balance in three areas:

— between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies,

—  between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States’ existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces, and

— between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to

What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign — a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation.

Foundation Principles for Leaders: Application of "Smart" Power

The Armed Services provide one of the better examples of a learning organization which is demonstrated by the current debate in Parameters, on the concept of Effect-based Operations (EBO) to include my response via a  letter to the editor. 

Many of the modern day quality improvement methods were pioneered by the War Department during WWII and evolved into programs/initiatives that have included zero-defects/six sigma, just-in-time/lean, quality circles, Total Quality Management, Capability Maturity Model Integration, Business Process Reengineering and now Continuous Process Improvement. 

Smart Power would include the application of the foundation principles for leaders to optimize all the elements and instruments of national power (also referred to as the “whole-of-government” approach) to help prevent/deter conflict and if deterrence fails, to resolve the conflict quickly and decisively with a minimum amount of resources.

The application of this technology is supported throughout the world by the American Society for Quality.

Acronyms: EBO – Effect based Operations;  ONA – Operational Net Assessment; SoSA – System of System Analysis, CPI – Continuous Process Improvement.

ARTICLES: Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 2008 

Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever, by Tomislav Z. Ruby

USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations” by James N. Mattis.  

To the Editor,

The Autumn 2008 issue of Parameters included two excellent articles on the Future of Effects-based Operations that illustrate a “clash of paradigms.” I agree with both authors on the points that “EBO is more important than ever” and that “underlying principles associated with EBO, ONA and SoSA are fundamentally flawed.”

In May 2008, the scope of DoD’s guidance on Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) was appropriately expanded to include combat organizations and will inevitably be applied to combat operations. The CPI concept also provides proven and complementary approaches to improve effectiveness as well as efficiency.

The way ahead is neither to abandon the EBO concept, nor to consider CPI as irrelevant nor to rely solely on traditional approaches, but rather to recognize and build upon foundational principles that effective leaders have intuitively applied when developing optimal strategies that synchronize a systems-of-systems approach with the more traditional and “time-honored principles and terminology.” Stakeholders, systems, variability, knowledge, planned change and people (1)  are the key components that provide the underlying principles for both traditional methods as well as emerging methods such as CPI, EBO, ONA, and SoSA. In a non-military application, the framework is applied to improve capabilities and in a military context, they are applied to reduce an adversary’s capabilities. Of the six principles, the concept of variability is the “what’s new?“ and most critical.

Variation is a law of nature that states that no two people or things will ever be exactly alike. Everyone and everything varies. In the 1920’s, Walter Shewhart developed the new but still relatively unknown paradigm for managing variation that has typically been defined using a scientific or statistical frame of reference.

In March of 2006, the American Society for Quality embraced a broader description of the concept to support more universal awareness and application. To summarize, variation represents the difference between the ideal situation and actual. An ideal represents a standard of perfection uniquely defined by the stakeholders that one can strive for but never achieve; a fact that makes continual improvement possible. Improving efficiency and/or effectiveness has always been achieved by reducing variation.

Ideal or perfect outcomes are defined as those benefiting everyone (win/win). Non ideal outcomes are those that result in zero-sum, somebody wins/somebody loses. Preventing war requires the most optimal (win/win) of approaches; war-fighting is all about optimizing the suboptimal.

Shewhart concluded that although everything varies and individual things are unpredictable, groups of things from a constant system of causes tends to be predictable within a range In other words, if you always do what you always did, on average, you will usually get what you always got. The variation principle is at the heart of military art and science that must address both chaos and order; chaos defined as order without predictability.

The application context for the foundation principles includes the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The distinctions between levels include scope, position of the primary stakeholders, required leadership competencies, degree of influence-direct vs. indirect, and time expected for achieving expected results—long-term, mid-term, short-term.

1. Stakeholders include individuals and groups that are affected by the respective situation in the short, mid and long term. Stakeholders, to include allies, adversaries or competitors, have needs, desires/wants and expectations that are met, or not met, by products/services that in military terms include the full spectrum of military operations. Stakeholder categories would include Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII).

2. Systems transform inputs into outputs (products/services) to achieve the outcomes expected by stakeholders. Outputs and Outcomes are results that are produced through action. Actions or tasks (collective and individual) are accomplished through processes. A process is a series of actions taken to achieve a result. A system is a collection of processes with a common aim or purpose.

The term process and system are often and correctly used interchangeability depending upon the context. Systems determine 85-98% of the result. Consequently, a “systems-of-systems approach” to build or reduce capability has always been the required strategy for achieving the best results.

3. Variation is inherent in every system and an assessment of variation is how stakeholders keep score, e.g., determine if things got better or worse. Shewart identified two causes of variation (common and special) and two types of systems/processes (stable and unstable).

Common cause is variation that can be expected and predicted within a range. Special cause is unusual or unexpected. Systems/processes consisting of all common causes are considered stable or more predictable; systems/processes containing both common and special are more unstable or unpredictable.

Given the variation principle, a problem is never solved because variation is never eliminated (and gets worse if improvement is not continual). A solved problem represents an acceptable degree of variation; a problem is an unacceptable degree of variation. Stakeholders take action based on their assessments as to the “acceptability” of the variation.

4. Knowledge of variability leads to better results. Feedback to include the qualitative, quantitative, statistical, notional and intuitive leads to information, information to potential knowledge and knowledge to potential wisdom. Knowledge and wisdom are gained through action and assessment to include after action reviews, lessons learned and captured in doctrine, and identification of the right way (s) forward.

5. Planned Change requires the application of problem solving and decision processes that are applied simultaneously at the three levels of warfare (strategic, operational, tactical) and tailored to three general categories: Maintain/sustain the situation, incremental improvement and/or radical improvement. The appropriate  level strategic plan provides the context needed to balance and align ends, ways, and means. 

6. The People principle includes learning and applying a basic knowledge of the behavior of individuals and groups to include their respective cultures and capabilities.

The foundation principles for leaders provide underlying principles that effective leaders have always intuitively applied to improve upon traditional methods as well as assessing the quality of what may perceived as new methods. New methods in this case being CPI applied to combat operations, the EBO concept, ONA, and SoSA. A more conscious awareness and understanding of the variation principle may help resolve the “clash of paradigms” with the effect being obtaining better results with fewer resources. 

 (1) Principles derived from Foundation for Leaders, PQ Systems, Dayton, OH. The term Stakeholder substituted for the term Customer.

Global Trends 2025: Leadership

Gloom, But Not Doom, (New York Times)…Editorial

There’s been a fair amount of hand-wringing since the nation’s intelligence community surveyed the world of 2025. But the headlines from “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” published by the National Intelligence Council, are not the whole story.

A relative decline in power also does not mean that the United States will not remain powerful. This country can and must continue to lead. There will be a particular premium on quick, nimble and farsighted decision-making and cooperation.

Their report on the concept states that “leadership is not an entitlement; it has to be earned and sustained. Leadership that serves common goals is the best way to inspire the many different peoples of the world to make shared commitments.” That is a good place to start.

 

Strategy: Pacific Command (PACOM)

U.S. Pacific Command Modifies Strategy (Honolulu Advertiser)…Richard Halloran

The U.S. Pacific Command, which controls American forces from the west coast of North America to the east coast of Africa, has fashioned a subtle revision in its strategy of reassuring friends and deterring potential enemies, notably China and North Korea.

*Officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region, some of whom apparently believe that conflict with China is likely, maybe inevitable. “The command wants to make sure that everyone understands that it is not inevitable,” said one officer.

“Deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula continues to be a priority,” the strategy says. It points to a “maturing U.S.-China military-to-military relationship” while acknowledging that “tension remains across the Taiwan Strait.”

The revised strategy calls for a “whole of government approach,” asserting that security in the Asia-Pacific region “demands a high degree of coordination, integration, and unity of effort” within the Pentagon and across other departments and agencies.

Iran: Strategic Doctrine

Deter Iran,  (Washington Times)…Louis Rene Beres, Thomas McInerney and Paul E. Vallely

…In the final analysis, President-elect Barack Obama must quickly fashion a broad, coherent and updated strategic doctrine from which effective and credible policy options can be suitably drawn and implemented. Among other refinements, it will be necessary to fully modernize our nuclear arsenal, and to reinvigorate all of our nuclear capabilities.

…  If, for any reason, Iran is permitted to “go nuclear,” our re-fashioned doctrine will have to identify viable options for coexistence with that country. In turn, these options will require enemy perceptions of persuasive American power and of an American willingness to actually use this power.

How should we deter a nuclear Iran, both from launching direct missile attacks, and from dispersing nuclear assets among terrorist proxies? Should our new president do more to aid and empower the Iranian opposition? And for “Deterrence Against Nuclear Terrorism,” how should he compensate for the absence of “fingerprints,” and for the limits of satellites and radars? This is significant because Ahmadinejad says that soon there will be a world without the United States and Israel. Coupled with his regular pronouncements to wipe Israel off the face of the earth, this sends nuclear alarm signals that cannot be ignored.

A nuclear threat to American cities could come from cars, trucks and ships. Ballistic missile defense would be of no use against such ground-based attacks. Could we truly convince Tehran and its surrogates that any proxy act of nuclear terrorism would elicit a massive nuclear retaliation against Iran itself? We must, but meaningful policies can emerge only from a carefully re-conceptualized U.S. strategic doctrine.

Louis Rene Beres is an author and political professor at Purdue University. Gen. Thomas Mcinerney is retired vice chief of staff of the Air Force and co-author with retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul E. Vallely of “The Endgame: Winning the War on Terror.”

Natl Security Strategy: Realism vs. Idealism

Obama’s Bush Doctrine, (Washington Post)…E. J. Dionne Jr.

In electing Barack Obama, the country traded the foreign policy of the second President Bush for the foreign policy of the first President Bush.

What’s most striking about Obama’s approach to foreign policy is that he is less an idealist than a realist who would advance American interests by diplomacy, by working to improve the country’s image abroad, and by using military force prudently and cautiously.

This sounds a lot like the foreign policy of George H.W. Bush, and it makes perfect sense that Obama has had conversations with the senior Bush’s closest foreign policy adviser, Brent Scowcroft. Obama has drawn counsel from many in Scowcroft’s circle, and Gates himself was deputy national security adviser under Scowcroft.

Obama did indeed denounce the impending war as “dumb,” “rash” and “based not on reason but on passion.” But in retrospect, the speech may be most notable for other things Obama said that separated him from some in his antiwar audience.

Not once but five times did Obama declare, “I don’t oppose all wars.” The first several paragraphs of the speech were devoted to the wars that Obama thought were justified: the Civil War, World War II — in which, he said, “that arsenal of democracy . . . triumphed over evil” — and the battle against terrorism after the attacks of Sept. 11. “I would willingly take up arms myself to prevent such tragedy from happening again,” he said.

In fact, Obama sounded a great deal like — Brent Scowcroft. In a widely noted 2002 op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, published six weeks before Obama gave his speech, Scowcroft warned that an invasion of Iraq “very likely would have to be followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.” Going to Iraq, Scowcroft said, would “divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism,” and it could “destabilize Arab regimes in the region,” “stifle any cooperation on terrorism” and “even swell the ranks of the terrorists.” Clinton, who once said that “we have to be both internationalists and realists,” is a natural fit with the new Obama-Scowcroft-Gates establishment. In explaining the appeal of Clinton, a senior Obama adviser recently spoke several times of the president-elect’s respect for her “toughness” and described the practical reasons for choosing a figure who would have instant credibility around the world.