Category: Intl Security

Unmanned Vehicles (Robots)

Aberdeen Starts Work On Robot Test Track, (Baltimore Sun)…David Wood, Nov 14, 2008

With U.S. and allied military convoys under increasing attack in Afghanistan, the Army began work yesterday on a new test track at Harford County’s Aberdeen Proving Ground that will be critical in developing high-speed unmanned, or robot, vehicles for convoy duty.

Robotic vehicles also will be tested for basic performance but also with different sets of sensors that are currently under development, Rooney said.

For example, the Army has been working on ground-penetrating radar to detect one form of bomb common in Afghanistan: a plastic bucket of explosives buried beneath the road surface, detonated by a simple pressure-activated switch.

The problem is that the current radars can see only a short distance ahead, and as a convoy gathers speed, it quickly outruns the distance the radar can see, according to Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz, commander of the Joint IED Defeat Organization, the Pentagon command with responsibility for protecting troops from roadside bombs.
“Logistics convoys would like to have a radar that looks 100 meters out in front of them,” Metz said in an interview.

Iraq: New IEDs

Militants Turn To Small Bombs In Iraq Attacks, (New York Times)…Katherine Zoepf and Mudhafer al-Husaini, Nov 14, 2008 pg1.

…And as security in Baghdad has improved, the small and furtive bomb — though less lethal than entire cars or even thick suicide belts packed with explosive — is fast becoming the device of choice for a range of insurgent groups. They are also contributing, in the midst of an uptick in violence, to a growing feeling of unease in the capital.

Light, portable and easy to lay, sticky bombs are tucked quickly under the bumper of a car or into a chink in a blast wall. Since they are detonated remotely, they rarely harm the person who lays them. And as security in Baghdad has improved, the small and furtive bomb — though less lethal than entire cars or even thick suicide belts packed with explosive — is fast becoming the device of choice for a range of insurgent groups.

 “You take a bit of C4 or some other type of compound,” said Lt. Col. Steven Stover, a spokesman for the United States military in Baghdad. “You can go into a hardware store, take the explosive and combine it with an accelerant, put some glass or marble or bits of metal in front of it and you’ve basically got a homemade Claymore,” a common antipersonnel mine.

War of Terrorism

Mr. Obama’s War, (Washington Post)…Editorial, Nov 9, 2008

The president-elect must both sustain and reform the fight against terrorism. …  Barack Obama made clear during the election campaign that he takes the threat of al-Qaeda and other extremist groups seriously. He’s been hawkish in proposing more troops for Afghanistan as well as unilateral strikes targeting al-Qaeda in Pakistan. He’s promised to dedicate more resources to preventing the worst-case scenario of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction.

Third War: Stateless Extremist Networks

Obama To Face A Third War — Against Stateless Extremist Networks
(Los Angeles Times)…Sebastian Rotella, November 9, 2008

Amid the focus on the wars that President-elect Barack Obama will inherit in Iraq and Afghanistan, a third conflict gets less attention: the shadow war against stateless networks of Islamic extremists.

A weaker Al Qaeda, tighter U.S. borders and the apparent lack of U.S. support networks make a new strike on American soil unlikely, though not impossible, according to Western anti-terrorism officials. Instead, the foremost possible scenario is an attack on U.S. targets in Europe similar to the alleged plots against American troops in Germany last year and transatlantic flights from London in 2006.

Iran: Latin American Interests

Iran’s Latin America Push, (Los Angeles Times)…John Kiriakou, Nov 8, 2008.

Iran, the ultimate mischief maker with global reach, astounding patience, a shameless marriage to mayhem and terrorism, and interests that fall squarely in opposition to those of the United States, is making major diplomatic inroads under Washington’s nose.

The United States still has an opportunity to stop the Iranians in their tracks in Latin America. But it’s a big job. The growing Iranian influence — inconceivable a decade ago — is the result of the decision by the United States to stop paying attention to the region. And it will only be reversed if the U.S. changes its policy.

Policy: Iran., nK, Mideast

Obama To Face Big Policy Decisions On Iran, N. Korea And Mideast, (Washington Post)…Glenn Kessler, Nov 8, 2008.

 

…Diplomatic issues rarely begin or end cleanly with a change of administrations, but Bush will be leaving his successor an extensive list of foreign policy processes. The new administration will have to quickly evaluate them and decide whether to continue along Bush’s path, make minor modifications or forge ahead in a different direction.

“Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon, I believe, is unacceptable,” Obama said yesterday. “And we have to mount an international effort to prevent that from happening.”

Obama has not indicated that he will offer any fresh thinking on how to deal with Hamas; at one point during the campaign, he accepted the resignation of an outside adviser who met with Hamas officials as part of his job for an international mediation group. But, during a visit to Israel in July, Obama said he would not wait “until a few years into my term or my second term” to seek a peace deal. This suggests that he may appoint a high-level Middle East peace envoy, freeing his secretary of state to concentrate on other issues.

On North Korea, Obama will inherit a process that is probably in worse shape than what Clinton left for Bush. In a dramatic change in approach during his second term, Bush avidly pursued a deal to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. But the effort nearly collapsed this fall before Bush agreed to remove North Korea from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Obama supported the decision to delist North Korea. During the campaign, he criticized Bush for taking so long to engage with North Korea, suggesting he would be eager to find ways to keep the disarmament process alive. Li Gun, a senior North Korean official, told reporters in New York on Thursday that “we are ready to deal” with the incoming Obama administration.

nKorea: Future Stability Concerns

Beijing Spurns U.S. Effort To Prepare In Event Of Korean Leader’s Demise, (Wall Street Journal)…Jay Solomon and Jason Leow, November 7, 2008, Pg. 11

The Chinese government has largely rebuffed Bush administration attempts to discuss contingency planning should North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il die or be unable to rule, according to current and former U.S. officials.

The reluctance is partly because Chinese diplomats and military officers fear planning for a post-Kim era could unnerve North Korean leaders and feed a perception the outside world is conspiring against the isolated state, Chinese scholars said.

Washington has been trying to establish some principles to govern a coordinated response by the U.S., South Korea and China. The U.S. has sought assurances the Chinese military won’t cross the Yalu River into North Korea in response to any instability, said the officials. Washington and Seoul also want guarantees that South Korea would take the lead in overseeing any humanitarian operations for the North.

Winning the Peace

Stability Operations and State Building: Continuities and Contingencies. Edited by Colonel Greg Kaufmann, U.S.A., Ret, September, 2008. Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA.

The Strategic Studies Institute and Austin Peay State University conducted an academic colloquium titled, “Stability Operations
and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies.” The purpose was to identify principles and supporting policies of state-building that will enhance America’s ability “to win the peace” while stabilizing chaotic regions. The approved list of “Principles to Win the Peace” were:

1. Ensure rule of law
2. Seek security: civil, military, economic
3. Pursue legitimacy
4. Encourage development
5. Foster self-empowerment and self-sufficiency
6. Foster communications

Thomas Barnett was one of the presenters. His session titled: How America Realigns Itself to the Current Geostrategic Landscape,  identifed the following points of emphasis:

• Leave the place more connected than you found it, across all networks possible.
•  romote industries that link the economy into existing and emergent production chains; any niche will do.
• Give the regime the technical and training wherewithal to secure its borders.
• Rehabilitate and/or build up air- and seaport security to meet American entry/fastpass standards, so that direct connections can be forged, giving transitioning states the software and hardware if necessary.
• Go slowly on elections and demands for democracy; most countries can only connect as single-party regimes because of the social and economic challenges involved with opening up to the global economy.
• Realize most societies have democracy within tribes and among tribal leaders, but that the decision point preference is consensus, not majority vote.
• Go with whatever traditional social hierarchal structure exists; build from that instead of transplanting.
• Do not push women’s rights so much as women’s education—especially for girls. (Remember how long it took for women to get the vote in the United States.)
• Do not feed people except for short durations and when extreme need arises; it is better to encourage agricultural development.
• Build police, not militaries.

In a previous posting, Economics, Political Change, Prediction Markets, I reference Barnett’s work in expanding economic connectivity through gloablization. His points of emphasis above reinforce the need for “phased-in variability” regarding  change … go slowly on elections, concensus vs. majority vote, focus on women’s education vs women rights, build on existing instead of transplanting.

Strategic Shocks

Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development. Nathan P. Freier , Nov 2008, Strategic Studies Institute.

Historically, defense strategy demonstrates three flaws: (1) it is generally reactive, (2) it lacks sufficient strategic imagination, and (3) as a result, it is vulnerable to surprise. The current administration confronted a game-changing “strategic shock” in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same kind of unconventional and nonmilitary shock to DoD convention early in its first term.