nKorea: Info Security

The Information Fortress Known As North Korea(Los Angeles Times)…John M. Glionna, Nov 14, 2008.

Some intelligence is smuggled out by groups and individuals these days, but the main thing outsiders know about the reclusive regime is that they know nothing.

Kim’s approach is, ‘Know thy enemy but don’t let them know us,’ “

These days, much of the information gathering on North Korea comes not from governments but private individuals and human rights groups that have managed to piece together a clandestine network of internal reporters. Some nongovernmental aid organizations return from the country with observations of what goes on there.

“Nobody is too confident about information out of North Korea,” Kang said. “Even the North Korean government isn’t that confident of the statistics they compile.”

“What Kim Jong Il has put together is a counter-intelligence masterpiece,” said Korean historian Andrei Lankov.

“I speak of the CIA’s record in North Korea as the longest running failure in the history of American espionage,” said Donald Gregg, a CIA station chief in South Korea in the 1970s and a former U.S. ambassador to Seoul. “It has always been the toughest of the tough targets. In my day, we truly did not know what was going on there.

“The lines of communication are opening up,” Howard said.

Good Friends publishes regular Internet reports on North Korea. One included such headlines as “Food Shortage Lowers the Attendance of a Munitions Factory in Eunduk County” and “15 People Publicly Executed in Onsung County.”

The group has also broken North Korean news, including an explosion in June involving a petroleum pipeline near Pyongyang.

“Someone threw a cigarette without thinking. There were lots of casualties, even deaths,” Kang said. “South Korean intelligence denied the story. They later came back and said we were right.”

Iraq: Closer to a Security Agreement: Dec 31, 2011

Iraqi Cabinet Backs U.S. Security Deal(Washington Post)…Mary Beth Sheridan, Nov 17, 2008, pg. A12.

…While the Cabinet vote indicated that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had rounded up the support of most of Iraq’s major parties, final passage of the accord is not guaranteed, politicians said. One issue is timing: The notoriously slow-moving Iraqi parliament is scheduled to adjourn Nov. 25 for a three-week break for hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage. “We have a limited window of time,” warned Hoshyar Zebari, the foreign minister.

Threats and Challenges: Next Administration

The Real World: Obama, (USA Today)…Ralph Peters, Nov 12, 2008.
…Utterly unexpected events could blindside us, but the following are a few of the looming challenges the Obama administration will face as it seeks its footing: Iraq. Afghanistan and Pakistan. Israel, Syria and Lebanon. Iran. Russia. Our military.

 Foreign policy promises will quickly bump up against circumstances

By Ralph Peters

On Nov. 4, the American people spoke. In the coming months, our enemies will speak. During this transition period and immediately after our new president’s inauguration, hostile actors around the globe will test a leader they view as untried and naive.

As president, Barack Obama will have to establish a strong identity quickly. Expectations, at home and abroad, are diffuse and contradictory. Just as American voters projected their own convictions onto both candidates, so allies and enemies overseas have constructed their own preferred images of Obama. Wishful thinking will have to be dispelled as our new president puts our interests first.

Utterly unexpected events could blindside us, but the following are a few of the looming challenges the Obama administration will face as it seeks its footing:

Iraq.

The president-elect has pledged prompt troop withdrawals, and his base expects him to act. But he won’t want to be seen as the “man who lost Iraq” and who reversed al-Qaeda’s strategic catastrophe. Obama is fortunate that the improved security situation will, indeed, allow substantial withdrawals. Even so, troops in significant numbers will need to remain for years to guarantee gains.

Even if President Obama ordered an immediate, total withdrawal, dismantling our effort and moving out of Iraq would be a huge logistical undertaking: It will take years to dismantle what it took years to build up. And our actions must be calculated to guarantee the gains made at such great cost.

Afghanistan and Pakistan.

During his presidential campaign, Obama made ambitious claims about this region, vowing to capture Osama bin Laden. Should the arch-terrorist be killed or captured, it will result from an intelligence break, not a campaign promise. Obama also has vowed to do a better job at winning in Afghanistan than President Bush has. But Afghanistan presents even deeper problems than did Iraq: It will take a generational commitment to ameliorate them, and they’ll never be fully solved. You don’t win in Afghanistan — you just make sure your enemies don’t win, either. Although engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains essential, the key is to have realistic expectations of what can be achieved.

Israel, Syria and Lebanon.

However incorrectly, Arab radicals and regimes perceive the president-elect as more favorable to their cause and less friendly to Israel. This is a formula for provocations by Hezbollah and Syrian machinations in Lebanon that could precipitate war as soon as next year. As president, Obama will need to be explicit in his commitments. He can no longer seek to be all things to all people.

Iran.

The most complex culture in the region is also the most difficult to deal with. The regime in Tehran faces internal disappointment with its performance, but it views nuclear weapons as an all-purpose answer. As for negotiations, Tehran consistently uses them to buy time. Possessed of nuclear weapons, Iran would dominate the Persian Gulf and the world’s key oil reserves — as well as threaten Israel. And concepts such as mutually assured destruction might not deter religious extremists. Again, there’s no good solution.

Russia.

One day after the U.S. election, President Dmitry Medvedev made a bellicose speech aimed at Obama. Announcing the intention to deploy a new generation of mid-range missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave — behind NATO lines — Medvedev explicitly threatened the U.S. missile-defense system to be deployed on Polish soil, and Poland itself.

With Russia’s economy in a far more fragile state than outsiders realize, the regime of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin might exploit this period of transition in Washington both to further its ambitions in neighboring states — such as Ukraine — and to divert attention from domestic problems by exciting nationalist passions.

Our military.

Obama has promised to strengthen our armed forces. He won’t be able to do it. Facing massive debts and decreased revenues, his budget staff will look for places to cut. Unable to trim entitlement programs — and with vast campaign promises to fulfill before 2012 — Obama almost inevitably will turn to the Pentagon as a source of savings.

The Obama administration will begin by trying to kill Cold War legacy systems of marginal utility, but he will run into bipartisan opposition in Congress. Legislators love to praise our troops, but they vote to preserve defense contracts. Our soldiers have no lobbying clout comparable to that of defense-industry giants. Budget advisers will fall back on cutting people and benefits, while an influential minority of political activists will be delighted to punish the military.

The long list of challenges runs from a crisis of shattered expectations in China, to the antics of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez. Somalia is lawless, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is drenched in blood. Even Mexico — the state most vital to our security — faces a disintegrative level of lawlessness. For all the global goodwill toward our next president, additional troop commitments from our allies will be few, while their expectations will be high. Obama, too, will find that there are times when a U.S. president must act because no one else will.

The potential tragedy of our charismatic next president is that he could repeat the patterns of his Democratic predecessors — Johnson, Carter and Clinton — in coming to the White House with a strong domestic agenda, only to be beleaguered by foreign policy.

Ralph Peters is a member of USA TODAY’s board of contributors and the author, most recently, of Looking For Trouble: Adventures in a Broken World.

Iraq: Kurdistan Model

Kurdistan Is A Model For Iraq, (Wall Street Journal)…Masoud Barzani, Nov 12, 2008.

Iraq’s Kurds have consistently been America’s closest allies in Iraq. Our Peshmerga forces fought alongside the U.S. military to liberate the country, suffering more casualties than any other U.S. ally.

Mr. Barzani is the president of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

nKorea: Setting conditions that "could inevitabley lead to war ."

North Korea Limits Tests Of Nuclear Site, (New York Times)…Choe Sang-Hun, Nov 12, 2008.

In its first major act of defiance since Senator Barack Obama’s election, North Korea said Wednesday that it would bar international nuclear inspectors from taking soil and nuclear waste samples, which are considered crucial to determining the extent of its weapons program.

North Korea detonated a plutonium-based device in 2006, adding urgency to arduous six-nation talks to halt the North’s nuclear program. As part of the eventual deal, the North made a declaration in June of its nuclear activities. President Bush then said he was prepared to remove North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the North demolished the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear plant.

But it was months before the North was removed from the list, while the United States wrangled with its negotiators over how to verify the North’s nuclear declaration and criticism of the Bush administration — for extracting too few concessions — mounted. Finally, in October, the State Department announced that North Korea had agreed to access “based on mutual consent” to undeclared nuclear sites and “sampling and forensic activities.”

North Korea’s statement on Wednesday contradicted that, and further, warned that if the United States diverged from the joint document “even by one word, it could lead inevitably to war.”

Iraq: Human Terrain Teams / Social Scientists

U.S. Military Using Social Scientists In Iraq (FNC)…David Mac Dougall, Nov 12, 2008.
Five years after the invasion comes a tacit acceptance that mission-focused American troops haven’t been able to devote enough time to simply getting to know the locals. The U.S. military is expanding a program in Iraq to send teams of anthropologists and social scientists across the country, acting as cultural analysts for U.S. forces.

 Special Report With Brit Hume (FNC), 6:00 PM

BRIT HUME: Know thy enemy is one of the oldest of military dicta. American forces are working on a variation of that in Iraq, trying to learn more about the people whose country they occupy and it is scientists, not soldiers, who are on these frontlines.

Reporter David Mac Dougall has the story.

DAVID MAC DOUGALL: Five years after the invasion comes a tacit acceptance that mission-focused American troops haven’t been able to devote enough time to simply getting to know the locals. The U.S. military is expanding a program in Iraq to send teams of anthropologists and social scientists across the country, acting as cultural analysts for U.S. forces.

“NANCY” [Anthropologist]: So we go out to the villages, into the cities and talk to the Iraqis, get an idea of their perceptions, their feelings, basically what they’re thinking about their culture and then we take that back to the military so they have a better understanding of the local population.

MAC DOUGALL: The program, though, is not without its critics. Some scholars are alarmed that anthropologists could be gathering information, which is then used by the military in lethal operations, a practice used during the Vietnam War, but later abandoned after public outcry.

Nancy and her co-worker Jean are concerned enough about their professional reputations that they requested we don’t fully identify them.

So much information is gathered about Iraqi men that U.S. commanders really know very little about the lives and concerns of women in this area. And there’s where the anthropologists’ expertise is vital – improving the flow of cultural intel, allowing the military to paint a clearer picture of the social landscape.

At first, the women in Kawaz-Arab are reluctant to come forward. Slowly, but surely Nancy and Jean plan to gain their trust, with repeat visits in the coming weeks, but there have already been successes.

“JEAN” [Anthropologist]: I never would have thought that I’d be sitting in a room filled with 20 Arab women and children and they’d be telling me intimate parts of their lives, how they live, how they love, how they mourn.

MAC DOUGALL: On the ground, U.S. commanders tell us they value the anthropologists’ input, but in reality many of the soldiers have more experience in Iraq than the social science teams. While the practice of deploying anthropologists is still considered counterinsurgency, commanders here say their information is not being used for traditional kinetic military fighting. Anthropologists like Jean and Nancy are able to bring a uniquely humanist touch to understanding Iraqis and that helps recast the U.S. military as more approachable in the minds of Iraqis they meet.

In Kawaz-Arab, Iraq, David Mac Dougall, Fox News.

Afghanistan Strategy: Larger Security Force

How To Win In Afghanistan(Wall Street Journal)…Michael O’Hanlon, Nov 14, 2008.

…So why build a large Afghan security force? The answer is simple: because the alternatives are worse. One possibility is to increase the number of NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan, pushing the combined cost of the operation well above the current $4 billion a month. The other possibility is most likely to lose the war.

The United States has been spending nearly $3 billion a year to fund the Afghanistan security forces of late. This is a great deal of money but far less than our own military costs in that country. We should be willing to double that $3 billion a year if need be. The added expenses need not stay high indefinitely. Once Afghanistan’s security forces have their needed equipment, and provided President Obama can cajole and pressure other major countries to foot their share of the bill, American security aid requirements should drop back to current levels.

Writing in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, two notable South Asia scholars asked whether the American political system was reliable enough to commit such funds to an enlarged Afghan security force over an extended period. The answer is yes. We have proven as much over the years in funding Korea and Taiwan, Greece and Turkey, and for the last three decades Egypt and Israel, when our core security interests dictated it. Certainly Afghanistan, where al Qaeda once had its main home — and where over 20 American GIs as well as another 10 foreign troops a month have been losing their lives, carrying out a mission that Afghans themselves are not yet ready to lead — is worth a comparable financial investment.