Iraq Security Agreement – Referendum by July 30, 2008

Top Shiite Cleric In Iraq Raises Concerns About Security Pact, (Washington Post)…Sudarsan Raghavan and Saad Sarhan, Nov 30, 2008.

Iraq’s preeminent Shiite spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, has expressed concern about the country’s security agreement with the United States, saying it gives the Americans the upper hand and does not do enough to protect Iraqi sovereignty, an official at his office said Saturday.

The agreement, approved by Iraq’s parliament Thursday, calls for U.S. troops to withdraw from towns and cities by next summer and from Iraq by the end of 2011.

Sistani, whose words carry great weight in Iraq, did not reject the pact outright and indicated that he would leave it to voters to decide its fate in a national referendum to be held by July 30. His comments will almost certainly bring pressure on the Shiite-led government and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to fulfill their promise to hold the vote.

Iran: Carrots and Sticks

The Battle For Iran, (Boston Globe)…John Tirman, Nov 29, 2008.

THE BATTLE for Iran is on – for Iran policy, that is – and a ferocious contest is in store. The combatants are former policy makers, scholars, and think tanks. They are issuing position papers and holding press conferences. On the front line of the contest are those with carrots and those with sticks, the ages-old choice in foreign affairs. Fortunately, history and circumstances provide a clear preference.

… “sticks” team … The Bipartisan Policy Council and United Against Nuclear Iran both see the nuclear weapons threat from Iran as imminent, particularly threatening our ally, Israel.

The other side – the “carrots” team – is a mirror image of former officials and scholars. They also regard a nuclear-armed Iran as a deplorable outcome, but their approach is far more reliant on a new diplomacy. One of the most prominent of these initiatives, the Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran …

Extracts: Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran — Five Key Steps the United States Should Take to Implement an Effective Diplomatic Strategy with Iran:

1. Replace calls for regime change with a long-term strategy:

2. Support human rights through effective, international means:

3. Allow Iran a place at the table – alongside other key states – in shaping the future of Iraq, Afghanistan and the region:

4. Address the nuclear issue within the context of a broader U.S. – Iran opening:

5. Re-energize the Arab-Israeli peace process and act as an honest broker in that process: Israel’s security lies in making peace with its neighbors.

Iran Policy: Now What?

An F for Bush’s  Iran Policy, By David Ignatius, Sunday, November 30, 2008; Page B07

Absent some last-minute fireworks, President Bush will leave office with a kind of double failure on Iran: Administration hard-liners haven’t checked Tehran’s drive to acquire nuclear-weapons technology, and moderates haven’t engaged Iran in negotiation and dialogue.

It’s easy to criticize the Bush record on Iran. But anyone who thinks it will be easy for Obama to make a breakthrough hasn’t been paying attention. Iran moves closer every day to becoming a nuclear-weapons power. It views America as an aggressive adversary that wants regime change, no matter what Washington says. Dialogue is worth a try, but Obama and his advisers should start thinking about what they will do if negotiations fail.

Tibet: "Middle Way" Policy Not Working

Exiled Tibetans gather in India to discuss new way, By Tim Sullivan, Associated Press, Nov 12, 2008

For 20 years, the exile movement has been guided by the Dalai Lama’s “middle way,” which rejects demands for outright independence but calls for limited autonomy for Tibet. Until very recently, the Dalai Lama had insisted on conciliation, repeatedly telling Beijing that progress for Tibet could come only through talks, and insisting he did not want independence.

Conciliatory talk, though, brought little but disdain from China. Instead, Beijing derides the Dalai Lama as a “splittist,” saying he really wants a Tibetan nation. For years, talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s envoys have ended in stalemate.

In October, the man who turned patience into an art form appeared to finally grow impatient.

The Dalai Lama said in a speech that after years of pursuing the middle way “there hasn’t been any positive response.”

“As far as I’m concerned I have given up,” he added.

Now, nearly everything is on the table for discussion. Starting Monday, exiled Tibetans from around the world will gather in Dharmsala, called together by the Dalai Lama for a six-day meeting that could end years of carefully moderated policies toward Beijing

Summary of some key points in the article:

The Stakeholders and their positions:

China: Issue has been settled. 1.3 billion people (vs 6 million); world’s largest army. China continuing to move thousands of ethnic Han Chinese into Tibet.

Dalai Lama: Middle Way Policy — limited autonomy and not independence, conciliation. Middle Way not working, time for new leadership.

Tibetan Youth Congress: … one of the more militant activist groups …

Prime Minister – Government-in-exile: Samdhong Rinpoche – need to identify a way-ahead.

Policy Options: Autonomy or Independence, More protests, angrier protests, boycotts, more pressure on Western nations, sabotage of China’s infrastructure … patience and “hope for a time when changes in China will lead to meaningful change in Tibet.”

Other (western) Countries.

Iran: Strategic Doctrine

Deter Iran(Washington Times)…Louis Rene Beres, Thomas McInerney and Paul E. Vallely

…In the final analysis, President-elect Barack Obama must quickly fashion a broad, coherent and updated strategic doctrine from which effective and credible policy options can be suitably drawn and implemented. Among other refinements, it will be necessary to fully modernize our nuclear arsenal, and to reinvigorate all of our nuclear capabilities.

…  If, for any reason, Iran is permitted to “go nuclear,” our re-fashioned doctrine will have to identify viable options for coexistence with that country. In turn, these options will require enemy perceptions of persuasive American power and of an American willingness to actually use this power.

How should we deter a nuclear Iran, both from launching direct missile attacks, and from dispersing nuclear assets among terrorist proxies? Should our new president do more to aid and empower the Iranian opposition? And for “Deterrence Against Nuclear Terrorism,” how should he compensate for the absence of “fingerprints,” and for the limits of satellites and radars? This is significant because Ahmadinejad says that soon there will be a world without the United States and Israel. Coupled with his regular pronouncements to wipe Israel off the face of the earth, this sends nuclear alarm signals that cannot be ignored.

A nuclear threat to American cities could come from cars, trucks and ships. Ballistic missile defense would be of no use against such ground-based attacks. Could we truly convince Tehran and its surrogates that any proxy act of nuclear terrorism would elicit a massive nuclear retaliation against Iran itself? We must, but meaningful policies can emerge only from a carefully re-conceptualized U.S. strategic doctrine.

Louis Rene Beres is an author and political professor at Purdue University. Gen. Thomas Mcinerney is retired vice chief of staff of the Air Force and co-author with retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul E. Vallely of “The Endgame: Winning the War on Terror.”

Natl Security Strategy: Realism vs. Idealism

Obama’s Bush Doctrine, (Washington Post)…E. J. Dionne Jr.

In electing Barack Obama, the country traded the foreign policy of the second President Bush for the foreign policy of the first President Bush.

What’s most striking about Obama’s approach to foreign policy is that he is less an idealist than a realist who would advance American interests by diplomacy, by working to improve the country’s image abroad, and by using military force prudently and cautiously.

This sounds a lot like the foreign policy of George H.W. Bush, and it makes perfect sense that Obama has had conversations with the senior Bush’s closest foreign policy adviser, Brent Scowcroft. Obama has drawn counsel from many in Scowcroft’s circle, and Gates himself was deputy national security adviser under Scowcroft.

Obama did indeed denounce the impending war as “dumb,” “rash” and “based not on reason but on passion.” But in retrospect, the speech may be most notable for other things Obama said that separated him from some in his antiwar audience.

Not once but five times did Obama declare, “I don’t oppose all wars.” The first several paragraphs of the speech were devoted to the wars that Obama thought were justified: the Civil War, World War II — in which, he said, “that arsenal of democracy . . . triumphed over evil” — and the battle against terrorism after the attacks of Sept. 11. “I would willingly take up arms myself to prevent such tragedy from happening again,” he said.

In fact, Obama sounded a great deal like — Brent Scowcroft. In a widely noted 2002 op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, published six weeks before Obama gave his speech, Scowcroft warned that an invasion of Iraq “very likely would have to be followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.” Going to Iraq, Scowcroft said, would “divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism,” and it could “destabilize Arab regimes in the region,” “stifle any cooperation on terrorism” and “even swell the ranks of the terrorists.” Clinton, who once said that “we have to be both internationalists and realists,” is a natural fit with the new Obama-Scowcroft-Gates establishment. In explaining the appeal of Clinton, a senior Obama adviser recently spoke several times of the president-elect’s respect for her “toughness” and described the practical reasons for choosing a figure who would have instant credibility around the world.

India: Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai

India’s Suspicion Of Pakistan Clouds U.S. Strategy In Region
(New York Times)…Jane Perlez, The terrorist attacks in Mumbai occurred as India and Pakistan, two big, hostile and nuclear-armed nations, were delicately moving toward improved relations with the encouragement of the United States and in particular the incoming Obama administration.

Indian Commandos Battle Assailants, (Washington Post)…Emily Wax
Indian army commandos struggled all day Thursday and into the early hours of Friday to regain control of two luxury hotels and a Jewish center in India’s commercial capital, battling armed assailants who were part of a group that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said was “based outside the country.” 

Attributes Suggest Outside Help, (Washington Post)…Craig Whitlock and Karen DeYoung
Analysts cite scale, compared with previous onslaughts.

Attackers’ Identity Remains Unclear, (Wall Street Journal)…Matthew Rosenberg
It remains unclear who was responsible for Wednesday’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai. But by Thursday, Indian officials had voiced suspicions that some of the terrorists were from Pakistan.