Author: Tim J. Clark

Iran and DIME

Israel, Iran And The Bomb
(Wall Street Journal)…John R. Bolton, July 15, 2008, Pg. 19

Iran’s test salvo of ballistic missiles last week together with recent threatening rhetoric by commanders of the Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guards emphasizes how close the Middle East is to a fundamental, in fact an irreversible, turning point.

….  State Department comments to Congress last week – even as Iran’s missiles were ascending – downplayed Iran’s nuclear progress, ignoring the cost of failed diplomacy. But the confident assumption that we have years to deal with the problem is high-stakes gambling on a policy that cannot be reversed if it fails. If Iran reaches weaponization before State’s jaunty prediction, the Middle East, and indeed global, balance of power changes in potentially catastrophic ways.

That is why Israel is now at an urgent decision point: whether to use targeted military force to break Iran’s indigenous control over the nuclear fuel cycle at one or more critical points. If successful, such highly risky and deeply unattractive air strikes or sabotage will not resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. But they have the potential to buy considerable time, thereby putting that critical asset back on our side of the ledger rather than on Iran’s.

…  When the real source of the threat, not just a surrogate, nears the capacity for nuclear Holocaust, can anyone seriously doubt Israel’s propensities, whatever the impact on gasoline prices?

Thus, instead of debating how much longer to continue five years of failed diplomacy, we should be intensively considering what cooperation the U.S. will extend to Israel before, during and after a strike on Iran. We will be blamed for the strike anyway, and certainly feel whatever negative consequences result, so there is compelling logic to make it as successful as possible. At a minimum, we should place no obstacles in Israel’s path, and facilitate its efforts where we can.

These subjects are decidedly unpleasant. A nuclear Iran is more so.

Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of “Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations” (Simon & Schuster, 2007).

In terms of the elements of national power, Diplomatic/Political, Information, Military, Economic (DIME),  article (information) touches on them all.

Lob Bombs …

‘Lob Bombs’ Called Biggest Worry For US Forces
(Boston Globe)…Robert Burns, Associated Press, July 12, 2008

US forces may be close to unlocking the mystery of who is behind a deadly innovation in Iraqi insurgents’ weapons, a “lob bomb” now being used in Baghdad to target US and Iraqi combat outposts, a senior American general said yesterday.

The 107 mm rockets that are used in the improvised bombs – which some call an airborne version of the roadside bombs that through the course of the war have been the leading killer of US troops – are manufactured in Iran, officials said. But some officers cautioned against assuming Iran is directly involved.

The weapons are launched from small trucks and are fired in multiples of four to nine rockets at a time. The detonation is sometimes triggered by a signal from a cellphone, other times by a washing machine timer.

COPQ: Most important costs …..

Ricochet, (Washington Post)…Warren Zinn, July 13, 2008
Pg. B1

The e-mail was a punch in the gut: “the soldier you made famous — killed himself last Saturday — thought you should know.”

But as I stared at his image on my wall, I couldn’t dodge the question: Did this photo have anything to do with his death? News reports said he hated the celebrity that came with the picture. How much, I wondered, did that moment — just 1/250th of a second when three lives intersected on a river bank in Iraq — contribute to the burdens he’d brought home with him? If I’d never taken his picture, would he have ended up as he did? Would he still have been a casualty of war?

Cost of Power Quality (COPQ):  “Most important costs are unknown and unknowable.”

Threat Assessment

Overstating Our Fears (Washington Post)…Glenn L. Carle, July 13, 2008
Pg. B7

…I spent 23 years in the CIA. I drafted or was involved in many of the government’s most senior assessments of the threats facing our country. I have devoted years to understanding and combating the jihadist threat. We rightly honor as heroes those who serve our nation and offer their lives to protect ours. We all “support the troops.” Yet the first step for any commander is to understand the enemy.

We must not delude ourselves about the nature of the terrorist threat to our country. We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are.

The writer was a member of the CIA’s Clandestine Service for 23 years and retired in March 2007 as deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats.

Vision and Commitment: Berlin, Iraq

We’re Not Leaving… (U.S. News & World Report)…Michael Barone, July 10, 2008.

On June 23, the Soviets cut off land access to West Berli. .

… Secretary of State George Marshall and Joint Chiefs Chairman Omar Bradley, two of America’s most respected generals, felt Berlin was indefensible and we should withdraw. One man disagreed. President Harry Truman, in one crucial meeting after another, said, We‘re not leaving Berlin.

Just as Truman’s Pentagon opposed the airlift, so George W. Bush’s Pentagon mostly opposed the surge strategy in Iraq.

But Bush, echoing Truman, said, at least in effect, We‘re not leaving Iraq. He embraced the proposals for the surge, which had been worked up by retired Gen. Jack Keane and American Enterprise Institute scholar Frederick Kagan. He found a commander, Gen. David Petraeus, who had rewritten the Army’s manual on counterinsurgency and who had the character and skill to put the surge into effect.

…The lessons are clear. Stand fast. Put the right men in charge. And never doubt the capacity of the men and women of the American military, when given the right orders, to perform far better than the experts predict.

Army: Learning System, Way Ahead

An Army That Learns
(Washington Post)…David Ignatius, July 13, 2008; Page B07

The U.S. Army has done something remarkable in its new history of the disastrous first 18 months of the American occupation of Iraq: It has conducted a rigorous self-critique of how bad decisions were made, so that the Army won’t make them again.

The study is blunt about how unprepared the Army was for the postwar challenges: “The DOD and the Army lacked a coherent plan to translate the rapid, narrow-front attack [on Baghdad] . . . into strategic success. Soldiers and commanders at nearly every level did not know what was expected of them once Saddam Hussein was deposed and his military forces destroyed.” The situation in spring 2003 “evoked the aphorism, ‘if you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there.’ ”

On Point II  testifies to the Army’s strength as a learning organization. (This study covers May 2003 to January 2005. An earlier volume, “On Point,” chronicled the initial assault on Baghdad.)

Politicians repeat, ad nauseam, the maxim that “those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” The U.S. Army is that rare institution in American life that is actually putting this precept into practice.

The Army is just one component of the national security system, Optimizing all elements of national ower requires a new paradigm.  

KOSOVO: Smart Power Success Story

NATO in KOSOVO.

NATO has been leading a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in Kosovo.

NATO currently has approximately 15,900 KFOR troops deployed in Kosovo to help maintain security and stability for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

KFOR contributing nations and troop numbers (as on 4 February 2008)

Transfer of Authority – Multi-National Task Force East, Kosovo Force (KFOR).

The U.S. Army has been at the core of KFOR since its deployment in the wake of the allied air campaign in June 1999. KFOR initially provided a deterrent to renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Serb and Yugoslav forces, established a secure environment and ensured public safety and order, demilitarized the Kosovo Liberation Army, supported the international humanitarian effort, and coordinated with and supported the international civil presence.

Typically, there are three categories of change: maintain/sustain the existing system/processes, incremental improvement and radical/re-design.

Kosova represents a transition from the “re-design” to the maintain/sustain category.

State Department: Smarter power

POST: Match and close. Thomas P.M. Barnett on July 11, 2008

ARTICLE: The State Department Confronts the Synergy Crisis, by Austin Bay, Strategy Page, June 24, 2008

Good and interesting sign. The program is basically what Enterra does in Kurdish Iraq, except we go way beyond matchmaking to actual deal closing with our investment centers.

But the underlying logic in each is the same: jobs are the only exit strategy and jobs are a private-sector function.

Referenced article introduces the State Depatment’s Economic Empowerment in Strategic Regions (EESR) with the aim to leverage internet connectivity in support of economic development.  

Enterra provides systems and processes (see development-in-a-box) that accelerate development and growth.  Similar concept to what Toyota  applied to become one of the  most successful auto manufactures in the world.   Using a sports metaphor, would be similar to applying a proven strategy that would include offensive and defensive playbooks, training plans, etc.

Afghanistan: Trends

A few extracts from articles providing examples on the use of the diplomatic element of national power to gain support for reducing the inflow of fighters from Pakistan.

U.S. Blames Pakistan As Afghanistan Incursions Rise (Wall Street Journal)…Yochi J. Dreazen. U.S. officials have begun blaming Pakistan for Afghanistan’s increasing violence, an escalation in rhetoric that suggests American patience with Pakistan’s new government is rapidly running out.

More Foreign Militants Operating In Pakistan, Joint Chiefs Boss Says. (San Diego Union-Tribune)…Associated Press. More foreign fighters, including al-Qaeda militants, are operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas than in the past, underscoring the need for Pakistan to crack down on insurgent safe havens, the top U.S. military officer said during a visit to the Afghan capital.

Flow Of Foreign Fighters Into Afghanistan Increasing. (FNC)…Jennifer Griffin. In an interview with Fox News, one of his first since becoming the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan 40 days ago, Gen. David McKiernan described his frustration with the rising violence his troops face emanating from Pakistan.