Joint Chiefs Chairman, President-Elect Meet

Joint Chiefs Chairman ‘Very Positive’ After Meeting With Obama (Washington Post)…Karen DeYoung, Nov 30, 2008.

…There was little talk of exiting Iraq or beefing up the U.S. force in Afghanistan; the one-on-one, 45-minute conversation ranged from the personal to the philosophical. Mullen came away with what he wanted: a view of the next president as a non-ideological pragmatist who was willing to both listen and lead.

…. Obama has been careful to separate his criticism of Bush policy from his praise of the military’s valor and performance,.

Obama’s expected retention of Robert M. Gates as defense secretary and expected appointment of Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton as secretary of state and retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones as national security adviser have been greeted with relief at the Pentagon.

In an October survey by the Military Times, nearly 70 percent of more than 4,000 officers and enlisted respondents said they favored McCain, while about 23 percent preferred Obama. Only African American service members gave Obama a majority.

Even as the Iraq war continues, Defense officials are far more worried about Afghanistan, where they see policy drift and an unfocused mission.

One of the biggest long-term military issues on Obama’s plate will be the defense budget, currently topping 4.3 percent of gross domestic product once war expenditures are included. Obama has said he will increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps, finding savings in the Iraq drawdown and in new scrutiny of spending, including on contractors, weapons programs and missile defense.

Iran: Carrots and Sticks

The Battle For Iran, (Boston Globe)…John Tirman, Nov 29, 2008.

THE BATTLE for Iran is on – for Iran policy, that is – and a ferocious contest is in store. The combatants are former policy makers, scholars, and think tanks. They are issuing position papers and holding press conferences. On the front line of the contest are those with carrots and those with sticks, the ages-old choice in foreign affairs. Fortunately, history and circumstances provide a clear preference.

… “sticks” team … The Bipartisan Policy Council and United Against Nuclear Iran both see the nuclear weapons threat from Iran as imminent, particularly threatening our ally, Israel.

The other side – the “carrots” team – is a mirror image of former officials and scholars. They also regard a nuclear-armed Iran as a deplorable outcome, but their approach is far more reliant on a new diplomacy. One of the most prominent of these initiatives, the Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran …

Extracts: Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran — Five Key Steps the United States Should Take to Implement an Effective Diplomatic Strategy with Iran:

1. Replace calls for regime change with a long-term strategy:

2. Support human rights through effective, international means:

3. Allow Iran a place at the table – alongside other key states – in shaping the future of Iraq, Afghanistan and the region:

4. Address the nuclear issue within the context of a broader U.S. – Iran opening:

5. Re-energize the Arab-Israeli peace process and act as an honest broker in that process: Israel’s security lies in making peace with its neighbors.

Iran Policy: Now What?

An F for Bush’s  Iran Policy, By David Ignatius, Sunday, November 30, 2008; Page B07

Absent some last-minute fireworks, President Bush will leave office with a kind of double failure on Iran: Administration hard-liners haven’t checked Tehran’s drive to acquire nuclear-weapons technology, and moderates haven’t engaged Iran in negotiation and dialogue.

It’s easy to criticize the Bush record on Iran. But anyone who thinks it will be easy for Obama to make a breakthrough hasn’t been paying attention. Iran moves closer every day to becoming a nuclear-weapons power. It views America as an aggressive adversary that wants regime change, no matter what Washington says. Dialogue is worth a try, but Obama and his advisers should start thinking about what they will do if negotiations fail.

Health-Care System – Quality Leadership Required

Many Experts Say Health-Care System Inefficient, Wasteful, By Ceci Connolly, Washington Post Staff Writer, Sunday, November 30, 2008; Page A01

Yet among physicians, insurers, academics and corporate executives from across the ideological spectrum, there is remarkably broad consensus on what ought to be done.

A high-performance 21st-century health system, they say, must revolve around the central goal of paying for results.

With those sorts of variations, the Dartmouth team concluded that as much as 30 percent of medical spending — or $700 billion — does nothing to improve care.

Note that any traditionally managed “system” (e.g., finance, government, defense, auto manufacturing, etc.,) has a cost of poor quality that can range from 20-40% of total budget or sales and any system (including the U.S. Political system) can be improved through a focus on “outcomes.”

A “traditionally managed system” is one in which the leaders/managers have no understanding of variation.

Health-Care: 5 Myth Theory

5 Myths About Our Ailing Health-Care System, By Shannon Brownlee and Ezekiel Emanuel, Washington Post, Sunday, November 23, 2008; Page B03

1. America has the best health care in the world.

2. Somebody else is paying for your health insurance

3. We would save a lot if we could cut the administrative waste of private insurance.

4. Health–care reform is going to cost a bundle.

5. Americans aren’t ready for a major overhaul of the health-care system.

Tibet: "Middle Way" Policy Not Working

Exiled Tibetans gather in India to discuss new way, By Tim Sullivan, Associated Press, Nov 12, 2008

For 20 years, the exile movement has been guided by the Dalai Lama’s “middle way,” which rejects demands for outright independence but calls for limited autonomy for Tibet. Until very recently, the Dalai Lama had insisted on conciliation, repeatedly telling Beijing that progress for Tibet could come only through talks, and insisting he did not want independence.

Conciliatory talk, though, brought little but disdain from China. Instead, Beijing derides the Dalai Lama as a “splittist,” saying he really wants a Tibetan nation. For years, talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s envoys have ended in stalemate.

In October, the man who turned patience into an art form appeared to finally grow impatient.

The Dalai Lama said in a speech that after years of pursuing the middle way “there hasn’t been any positive response.”

“As far as I’m concerned I have given up,” he added.

Now, nearly everything is on the table for discussion. Starting Monday, exiled Tibetans from around the world will gather in Dharmsala, called together by the Dalai Lama for a six-day meeting that could end years of carefully moderated policies toward Beijing

Summary of some key points in the article:

The Stakeholders and their positions:

China: Issue has been settled. 1.3 billion people (vs 6 million); world’s largest army. China continuing to move thousands of ethnic Han Chinese into Tibet.

Dalai Lama: Middle Way Policy — limited autonomy and not independence, conciliation. Middle Way not working, time for new leadership.

Tibetan Youth Congress: … one of the more militant activist groups …

Prime Minister – Government-in-exile: Samdhong Rinpoche – need to identify a way-ahead.

Policy Options: Autonomy or Independence, More protests, angrier protests, boycotts, more pressure on Western nations, sabotage of China’s infrastructure … patience and “hope for a time when changes in China will lead to meaningful change in Tibet.”

Other (western) Countries.

Financial Crisis: Analysis and Projections

POST: Revealing charts on losses in the financial crisis, Thomas P.M. Barnett on November 28, 2008.

Post provides a synopsis and links to four articles in Economist magazine.

FINANCE AND ECONOMICS: “Global finance: Lifelines; A special section on the crisis looks at prospects for the global economy, individual countries and markets. It begins with the tricky job of saving the financial system,” The Economist, 11 October 2008.

FINANCE AND ECONOMICS: “Fiscal implications: Deep pockets; State backstops work best if banks are small and borrow at home,” The Economist, 11 October 2008.

FINANCE AND ECONOMICS: “The world economy: Bad, or worse; At best, the world economy is on the brink of recession,” The Economist, 11 October 2008.

SPECIAL REPORT: “When fortune frowned: A special report on the world economy,” by Zanny Minton, The Economist, 11 October 2008.

Iran: Strategic Doctrine

Deter Iran,  (Washington Times)…Louis Rene Beres, Thomas McInerney and Paul E. Vallely

…In the final analysis, President-elect Barack Obama must quickly fashion a broad, coherent and updated strategic doctrine from which effective and credible policy options can be suitably drawn and implemented. Among other refinements, it will be necessary to fully modernize our nuclear arsenal, and to reinvigorate all of our nuclear capabilities.

…  If, for any reason, Iran is permitted to “go nuclear,” our re-fashioned doctrine will have to identify viable options for coexistence with that country. In turn, these options will require enemy perceptions of persuasive American power and of an American willingness to actually use this power.

How should we deter a nuclear Iran, both from launching direct missile attacks, and from dispersing nuclear assets among terrorist proxies? Should our new president do more to aid and empower the Iranian opposition? And for “Deterrence Against Nuclear Terrorism,” how should he compensate for the absence of “fingerprints,” and for the limits of satellites and radars? This is significant because Ahmadinejad says that soon there will be a world without the United States and Israel. Coupled with his regular pronouncements to wipe Israel off the face of the earth, this sends nuclear alarm signals that cannot be ignored.

A nuclear threat to American cities could come from cars, trucks and ships. Ballistic missile defense would be of no use against such ground-based attacks. Could we truly convince Tehran and its surrogates that any proxy act of nuclear terrorism would elicit a massive nuclear retaliation against Iran itself? We must, but meaningful policies can emerge only from a carefully re-conceptualized U.S. strategic doctrine.

Louis Rene Beres is an author and political professor at Purdue University. Gen. Thomas Mcinerney is retired vice chief of staff of the Air Force and co-author with retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul E. Vallely of “The Endgame: Winning the War on Terror.”

Natl Security Strategy: Realism vs. Idealism

Obama’s Bush Doctrine, (Washington Post)…E. J. Dionne Jr.

In electing Barack Obama, the country traded the foreign policy of the second President Bush for the foreign policy of the first President Bush.

What’s most striking about Obama’s approach to foreign policy is that he is less an idealist than a realist who would advance American interests by diplomacy, by working to improve the country’s image abroad, and by using military force prudently and cautiously.

This sounds a lot like the foreign policy of George H.W. Bush, and it makes perfect sense that Obama has had conversations with the senior Bush’s closest foreign policy adviser, Brent Scowcroft. Obama has drawn counsel from many in Scowcroft’s circle, and Gates himself was deputy national security adviser under Scowcroft.

Obama did indeed denounce the impending war as “dumb,” “rash” and “based not on reason but on passion.” But in retrospect, the speech may be most notable for other things Obama said that separated him from some in his antiwar audience.

Not once but five times did Obama declare, “I don’t oppose all wars.” The first several paragraphs of the speech were devoted to the wars that Obama thought were justified: the Civil War, World War II — in which, he said, “that arsenal of democracy . . . triumphed over evil” — and the battle against terrorism after the attacks of Sept. 11. “I would willingly take up arms myself to prevent such tragedy from happening again,” he said.

In fact, Obama sounded a great deal like — Brent Scowcroft. In a widely noted 2002 op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, published six weeks before Obama gave his speech, Scowcroft warned that an invasion of Iraq “very likely would have to be followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.” Going to Iraq, Scowcroft said, would “divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism,” and it could “destabilize Arab regimes in the region,” “stifle any cooperation on terrorism” and “even swell the ranks of the terrorists.” Clinton, who once said that “we have to be both internationalists and realists,” is a natural fit with the new Obama-Scowcroft-Gates establishment. In explaining the appeal of Clinton, a senior Obama adviser recently spoke several times of the president-elect’s respect for her “toughness” and described the practical reasons for choosing a figure who would have instant credibility around the world.