Army: FCS Spin Out 1

Future Combat Systems Complete First Major Test
WASHINGTON (Army News Service, June 11, 2008)

Army Evaluation Task Force Soldiers tested FCS Spin Out 1 systems over the course of several weeks within conditions representative of today’s operational environment in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Spin Outs are designed to bring Future Combat Systems capabilities into current force modular brigades in support of Army modernization. Spin Out 1 consists of four different, but inter-operable systems.

It was the first time FCS equipment has been tested in continuous operations under stressful, realistic conditions in the hands of Soldiers.

U.S. Forces: Need for speed

OEF, OIF Demonstrating U.S. Forces Will Need To Be More SOF-Like
(Defense Daily)…Geoff Fein, June 11, 2008 , Pg. 1

After six years in Afghanistan and five in Iraq, top military brass are seeing that U.S. forces will need to be much more SOF (Special Operations Forces)-like, with the ability to move quickly and be more adaptive, says a senior military leader. 

The one [requirement] that jumps off the page is the requirement for all services to be SOF-like–to be netted, to be much more flexible, adaptive, faster, lethal, precise– whether it is soft power or hard power, whether it’s projects or kinetics, to bring that into play very very rapidly," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at the Defense Writers Group yesterday.

"Everything is flatter and faster, and I believe all of us have to adapt in that way," he added.

Mullen emphasized the importance of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). He pointed out that the services have significantly increased the pace of fielding ISR capabilities.

Iran: Watch and Wait

At The Tip Of Iran’s Spear, (Washington Post)…David  Ignatius, June 8, 2008; Page B07

Let’s try for a moment to put ourselves in the mind of Brig. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. For it is the soft-spoken Soleimani, not Iran’s bombastic president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who plays a decisive role in his nation’s confrontation with the United States.

…  So imagine that you are Qassem Soleimani, commander of a covert Iranian army deployed across the Middle East: You doubt the Bush administration would run the risk of a military strike against Iran, but you can’t be sure. You think America can’t afford to play chicken in an election year, but you can’t be certain of that, either.  So you watch and wait. 

… After a particularly heavy day of shelling, Gen. David Petraeus sent Soleimani a message — “Stop shooting at the Green Zone.” The message was conveyed verbally by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. The Quds Force commander didn’t react immediately. But the heavy mortar fire on the Green Zone soon tapered off. Iran had flexed its muscles and demonstrated America’s vulnerability, and then opted for a tactical retreat.

War-Fighting Doctrine – Irregular

Irregular Warfare, (New York Times Magazine)…William Safire, June 8, 2008

…That’s the ticket: irregular has become the Defense Department’s adjective of choice to modify the current style of warfare.

The definition for irregular warfare — cautiously marked “proposed” when approved in September 2007 by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and other top brass — is “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.

Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.”

In defining the war-fighting doctrine now evolving, no matter how broad its range of techniques, it’s useful to grasp the direction of the definition: Irregular warfare is not our nation’s war on enemy irregulars but our inclusion of irregular methods in warring on an unconventional enemy.

Star Wars: Progress

Proving Missile Defense, (Washington Times)…John E. Carey, June 9, 2008  Pg. 25

…Today, Navy ships have shown they can reach targets on the edge of space, almost anywhere within the atmosphere, and down close to the ground. These ships equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system have shown they could destroy a North Korean ballistic missile headed for Japan, the United States or any number of targets in the Pacific region.

The Navy’s Ballistic Missile Defense Program grew from decades of Navy missile defense and guided missile ship development and President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI, once derisively dubbed “star wars” by critics and most of the media, has evolved from a space-based concept into a more realistic sea and land-based “system of systems.”

Today the at sea effort by the U.S. Navy and Japan’s Navy is one of the more demanding and successful elements of the ballistic missile defense effort. Japan’s Navy already deploys this capability aboard its four Kongo class Aegis guided missile destroyers.

Air Force Leadership Changes: Variation Principle

Moseley: We Need A Failsafe To Human Error (Air Force Times)…Vago Muradian, June 9, 2008  Pg. 12

A day after Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked for and received his resignation June 5, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley gave this exclusive interview to staff writer Vago Muradian. 

…  Following the Minot incident, I would say more than 95 percent of my focus has been about getting this right, and we had a commander-directed inquiry. I commissioned Maj. Gen. [Polly] Peyer to conduct a blue ribbon review, which gave us 120 or so specific things to address.

My fundamental tasking to her was, “Is there something bigger here? Is this just an isolated case of a human frailty or are there systemic bigger issues that we have to find and fix?”

Relative to the variation principle, reference to “isolated case” refers to special cause variation. Reference to “systemic” refers to common cause variation.   If the problem is due to common causes, a permanent and fundamental change is needed. A special cause refers to a temporary or fleeting event.  Required action would be ensuring execution on existing policies and procedures.

A second article, Air Force Shake-Up May Lead To Deeper Overhaul
(Christian Science Monitor)…Gordon Lubold, June 9, 2008, infers a systemic issue. “Extraordinary” refers to special cause variation.

…Gates’s nominee for Air Force secretary will reportedly be Michael Donley, now a top Pentagon aide. He will have to examine the institutional culture that led to the incidents in the first place. A Pentagon investigation directed by Gates in March concluded that there were systemic problems the service had failed to address.

The US Air Force must undertake a wholesale assessment of itself in the wake of the extraordinary firings last week of its top two officials, say analysts.

Army (ARDEC) – Recognized Sustained Excellence

REMARKS: Joseph A. Lannon, Director, ARDEC

It is a tremendous honor to stand here today and accept this prestigious award, the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award, on behalf of my co-workers at the United States Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center, also known as ARDEC.

Our prescription for organizational success is very basic. Everything we do is bound by a commitment to the customer, our warfighters, whose lives depend on our work.

Four basic components—coupled with hard work, tenacity and vision—have shaped ARDEC into the organization it is today:

  • Innovation in both product and process;
  • Persistence in the pursuit of excellence;
  • External evaluation and continuous learning to accelerate improvement; and
  • A culture that thinks like a “for-profit” great business with a bottom line.

2007 was the first year for the nonprofit category.  The Award recognized SUSTAINED and PROVEN (auditable) excellence over several years.  

The Good or Great Page provides a notional comparison of Baldrige to the concepts of capability maturity, cost of poor quality, sigma, and knowledge of variation.

Air Force: Change in Leadership

ARTICLE: Gates Ousts Top Leaders Of Air Force After Gaffes. (Wall Street Journal)…Yochi J. Dreazen June 6, 2008, Pg. 1

…Beyond the gaffes, the firings are the culmination of a broader dispute between Mr. Gates and the Air Force’s leadership over the service’s strategic direction.

The forced resignations mark an attempt by Mr. Gates to use his remaining time in office to shake up the service, which he believes has failed to adapt to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Senior Pentagon officials said the move marked the first time a defense secretary had simultaneously fired the two top leaders of a service like the Air Force. They said Mr. Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, felt the recent mistakes merited severe penalties.

The immediate trigger for the resignations of Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Gen. Michael Moseley, its chief of staff, was the March disclosure that the Air Force had accidentally sent four ballistic-missile fuses to Taiwan 18 months earlier, a discovery that infuriated Chinese officials.

Remotely Piloted Craft

U.S. Pushes To Rely More On Remotely Piloted Craft (New York Times)…Thom Shanker, June 5, 2008

…The push to increase missions by the Predator, and its larger and more deadly variant, the Reaper, has been an issue of serious contention between Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and the armed services, in particular the Air Force.

Navy Sees Future With Drones For Spying But Not Fighting(Washingtonpost.com)…Sebastian Abbot, Associated Press

The Navy lags well behind the Air Force in the development of armed drones — the unmanned aircraft now used increasingly in Iraq and Afghanistan — insisting that its “Top Gun” fighter pilots are still smarter, better and more flexible in combat. But the contrasting visions for the next generation of America’s air arsenal point to wider debates within the military about the pace of incorporating remote-control technology into future battle strategies.

DoD: Cost overruns – CPI

 Senator Warns Of A ‘Crisis’ In Pentagon Cost Overruns(New York Times)…Charlie Savage

The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday declared that cost overruns for Defense Department weapons had “reached crisis proportions,” after government auditors reported that the projected final cost of the Pentagon’s major programs had ballooned $295 billion over initial budget estimates.

Czar Pitched To Rein In Pentagon. (Washington Times)…Rowan Scarborough

The Pentagon is so awash in cost-bloated weapon systems that it now needs a pricing czar to double-check estimates that have missed the mark by a staggering $295 billion in just the past several years.

DoD issued guidance on their Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) Transformation Initiative in May 2006. Gordon England, Deputy Secreatary of Defense reinforced the expectation that

…”every DoD organization is focused every day on improving the effectiveness of our support for the Warfighter.”

Cost overruns on systems nothing new.