nKorea: Counteraction …

N. Korea Fuel Aid Halted, (Washington Times)…Yoo Choonsik, Reuters News Agency, Dec 14, 2008.

FUKUOKA, Japan — North Korea on Saturday threatened to slow the disablement of its main nuclear plant after Washington said energy aid to the nation had been suspended because of failed talks on verifying the North’s operations.

China, Japan and South Korea expressed regret that the North had failed to agree to specific steps on verifying its nuclear activities at multilateral talks in Beijing last week.

U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said all five countries negotiating with North Korea – Japan, Russia, China, the United States and South Korea – had agreed that future fuel shipments would not go forward until there was progress on a so-called verification protocol with Pyongyang.

Drone-Pilot Burnout

Drone-Pilot Burnout (New York Times Magazine)…Aaron Retica

…the Predator crews at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada “are at least as fatigued as crews deployed to Iraq,” if not more so, according to a series of reports by Air Force Lt. Col. Anthony P. Tvaryanas.

… remote pilots do not receive the kind of cues from their sense of touch and place that pilots who are actually in their planes get automatically. That makes flying drones physically confusing and mentally exhausting.

Iraq Rebuilding: Cost of Poor Quality

Official History Spotlights Iraq Rebuilding Blunders, (New York Times)…James Glanz and T. Christian Miller, Dec 13, 2008.

Poor planning, waste and deception led to $200 billion failure, report says

An unpublished 513-page federal history of the American-led reconstruction of Iraq depicts an effort crippled before the invasion by Pentagon planners who were hostile to the idea of rebuilding a foreign country, and then molded into a $100 billion failure by bureaucratic turf wars, spiraling violence and ignorance of the basic elements of Iraqi society and infrastructure.

Among the overarching conclusions of the history is that five years after embarking on its largest foreign reconstruction project since the Marshall Plan in Europe after World War II, the United States government has in place neither the policies and technical capacity nor the organizational structure that would be needed to undertake such a program on anything approaching this scale.

James Glanz reported from Baghdad, and T. Christian Miller, of the nonprofit investigative Web site ProPublica, reported from Washington.

Iran: Internal Economic Challenges

No Rush On Iran, (Los Angeles Times)…Hossein Askari, Dec 13, 2008

A bevy of foreign policy experts are pressing Barack Obama to move quickly on his promise to “engage in aggressive personal diplomacy” with Iran. He’d be better off first taking a long, deep breath and allowing Iran’s economic crisis to take its toll on the mullahs before getting down to serious business.

The political landscape has shifted dramatically in Iran in the last few months, handing the United States policy options it hasn’t had since the 1979 revolution. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s populist expenditure policies, coupled with the unprecedented collapse of the oil market, have driven Iran into an economic tailspin. The result is that Iran is more vulnerable to focused economic sanctions than it has been in 30 years.

Iran’s record of economic failure since the revolution is astonishing. Average real per-capita income is lower and income distribution is more unequal. Oil production has dropped 30% and yet dependence on oil revenues is higher. The unemployment rate is hovering around 25%, and this year inflation may top 30%.

Afghanistan: Regional Problem

The Aimless War: Why Are We In Afghanistan?, (Time)…Joe Klein, Dec 11, 2008

…The war in Afghanistan — the war that President-elect Barack Obama pledged to fight and win — has become an aimless absurdity. It began with a specific target. Afghanistan was where Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda lived, harbored by the Islamic extremist Taliban government. But the enemy escaped into Pakistan, and for the past seven years, Afghanistan has been a slow bleed against an array of mostly indigenous narco-jihadi-tribal guerrilla forces that we continue to call the “Taliban.”

In his initial statements, Obama has seemed more sophisticated about Afghanistan than Bush. In an interview with me in late October, Obama said Afghanistan should be seen as part of a regional problem, and he suggested that he might dispatch a special envoy, perhaps Bill Clinton, to work on the Indo-Afghan-Pakistani dilemma. Clinton seems a less likely prospect since his wife was named Secretary of State. The current speculation is that Richard Holbrooke may be selected for the job, which would be a very good idea.

Afghanistan: " A long fight"

Gates Predicts ‘Sustained’ Afghan Mission, (Washington Post)…Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press

The U.S. military will pour thousands of troops into Afghanistan by next summer and can expect to commit a sustained force for several more years, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and his top military commander there said Thursday.

When the additions are complete, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan will climb to more than 50,000. About 31,000 U.S. troops are there now.

South Korea: Nomalization of Tours

USFK Begins Process Of Normalizing Tours, (Pacific Stars and Stripes)…Ashley Rowland

U.S. Forces Korea eventually will allow half of the 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea to serve here with their families, a dramatic change in an area once considered too remote, and too dangerous for families because of the threat from an unstable North Korea.

As a first step toward what the military calls “tour normalization,” USFK roughly will double the number of command-sponsored slots in the next year — to 4,350 in Seoul, Osan, Pyeongtaek, Daegu and Chinhae.

As many as 2,100 troops in Area I, just south of the heavily-guarded border between North Korea and South Korea, also will get two-year command sponsorships, U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Walter Sharp said Wednesday.

“I think it adds deterrence value for North Korea,” Sharp said. “It says: ‘OK, we’re comfortable enough in our capabilities, we’re comfortable that we’re bringing families over here, and you better not miscalculate.”

About the same number of troops in Area I, officially called U.S. Army Garrison-Red Cloud, have already brought their families to South Korea, but haven’t received family housing or cost-of-living allowances because they aren’t command sponsored.

Dr. David Chu, undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, signed a memorandum on Dec. 1 that approves USFK’s request for the shift, and authorizes changes to the Joint Federal Travel Regulation, which sets tour lengths for U.S. military installations around the world.

Most of those 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea serve on one-year unaccompanied tours.

Under the new policy, troops serving in accompanied billets will stay for three years in all areas except Area 1. Accompanied tours to Area I will be set at two years.

Unaccompanied tours for most troops will remain at one year, but some “key personnel” will serve 2-year unaccompanied tours, USFK said.

Services may begin extending tour lengths now but are required to submit plans for implementation to Chu by March 1 USFK spokeswoman Col. Jane Crichton said Wednesday.

The move comes after two USFK commanders — Sharp and his predecessor, retired Gen. B.B. Bell — pushed Congress, the Department of Defense and South Korea to approve extended tour lengths. Longer accompanied tours are standard in Japan, Europe and at many U.S. bases in the rest of the world.

Sharp said there was little resistance, but cited many questions among Defense Department officials — “a lot of: ‘How are you going to do that? Do you really have the infrastructure to do that?’ ”

Bell, who retired in June, began lobbying for normalized tours about three years ago, saying the yearlong unaccompanied tours were outdated and that South Korea was modern and safe enough for families. Accompanied tours also would reduce stress on servicemembers who had to leave their families behind, he said.

Sharp said having longer tours “greatly increases” USFK’s military capabilities, and will let him have a more cohesive staff in place as he approaches the critical 2012 transfer of military operational control on the peninsula to South Korea’s military leaders.

“I don’t have to train new people every year,” Sharp said.

Sharp said he didn’t know how long it would take to reach full normalization, but Bell predicted in May that it could take 10 to 15 years.

Crichton said the changes to tour lengths in South Korea will affect worldwide troop rotations, and could take awhile to implement. Services with a small presence in South Korea, like the Marines, may be able to increase tour lengths and command sponsorships faster than those with larger numbers, like the Army, she said.

Sharp said the new policy will affect mostly incoming servicemembers, but those already stationed here can apply for the extended accompanied tours.

He said the pace of normalization depends on how quickly the United States and South Korea pay for the facilities — particularly schools — needed to house and support families. The two countries are in discussions to determine how much each will pay toward the cost of stationing U.S. troops here.

South Korea now pays about 41 percent under a two-year agreement between the two countries. Before negotiations began this year, U.S. officials called for South Korea to increase its support to 50 percent and to have a longer agreement.

Sharp said the longer tours also mean that more middle-grade officers and noncommissioned officers — ranks in high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan — could be stationed in South Korea.

Under the old system, an NCO or middle-grade officer who deploys to the Middle East probably would not be stationed in South Korea immediately before or after deployment, because troops can’t be forced to serve back-to-back unaccompanied tours.

“Effectively, he’s not deployable to Iraq or Afghanistan for a three-year period,” Sharp said.

With the new system, the number of troops available for deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan won’t be affected by increasing tour lengths here, he said. After full normalization, South Korea-based units might be deployable to combat zones, the general said. During a news conference Thursday, he said deployed troops’ families may remain in South Korea.

Sharp said he expects the Defense Department to put more importance — and possibly more money — into the U.S. military presence in South Korea after the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review, held every four years to assess U.S. military strategic direction.

U.S. bases in South Korea are a key point of its presence in the strategic Northeast Asia region.

“Korea’s a very important part of the world for us,” he said. “It will be after 2012.”

diME: Military and Economic Power in Combating Terrorism

U.S. Military To Target Terror Finance Networks, (Bloomberg.com)…Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg News

…The initiative was spurred by the success of a joint team of Treasury and Special Forces that has been operating in Iraq since 2005 and it reflects the renewed emphasis under Defense Secretary Robert Gates to improve capabilities in irregular warfare, said Edward Frothingham, who directs counter-narcotics operations for the Pentagon.

DNA Profiles: Terrorists

Pentagon Database Swells To 80,000 DNA Profiles, (USA Today)…Peter Eisler, Dec 12, 2008

The Pentagon has catalogued 80,000 DNA profiles in an obscure database that holds genetic information on foreign terrorism suspects and detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to Defense officials and documents.

Iran: Drop in IEDs

U.S. Says Drop In Iraq Deaths Tied To Iranian Arms Cutback, (Los Angeles Times)…Julian E. Barnes

A marked decline in the number of explosive devices coming into Iraq from neighboring Iran has helped reduce the frequency of deadly attacks against U.S. service members, a top U.S. general said Thursday.