Iran Diplomacy: Unintended Consequences?

Articles on the Iran run the gamut from the application of “Military” power vice “Diplomatic.”  “Economic ” incentives used to encourage peaceful resolution while the news media  provide “Information” that includes the full range of potential possibilities.  The unintended consequence mentioned in the article is bolstering Ahmadinejad’s re-election campaign. 

Now Bush Is Appeasing Iran, (Wall Street Journal)…Michael Rubin, July 21, 2008, Pg. 11

…Diplomacy is not wrong, but President Bush’s reversal is diplomatic malpractice on a Carter-esque level that is breathing new life into a failing regime. The Iranian government has spent billions of dollars — money that might have been better spent on refineries and gas turbine power plants — on a nuclear program that has failed to produce a single kilowatt of electricity.

On May 31, 2006, Condoleezza Rice drew a red line in front of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program. “The Iranian government’s choices are clear,” she said. “The negative choice is for the regime to maintain its current course. . . . If the regime does so, it will incur only great costs.” She also offered an olive branch: “As soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU-3 colleagues and meet with Iran’s representatives.”

Two years later, Iranian officials have installed more than 3,000 centrifuges in a facility designed to hold 50,000.

While European diplomats hope regime pragmatists might reinject responsibility in the Iranian debate, Ms. Rice’s State Department has bolstered Ahmadinejad and his fellow travelers. As Ahmadinejad begins his re-election campaign, he can say he has successfully brought Washington to its knees through blunt defiance, murder of U.S. troops in Iraq, and Holocaust denial. Should he win re-election in 2009, he will have Mr. Bush’s whiplash diplomacy to thank for his greatest — and, given the state of his economy, perhaps only — victory.

Mr. Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Iraq: Defining Victory

Two articles that contrast the challenges in a Democracy during a war. Once the commitment to go to war is made, how do you avoid the perception that one political party wants to see the other lose?

We Have Won The War In Iraq(New York Daily News)…Michael Yon, July 21, 2008, Pg. 19

“The war in Iraq is over. We won. Which means the Iraqi people won.” When I wrote this on my Web site a few days ago, I set off a mini-firestorm. Perhaps because I have spent more time embedded with combat troops in Iraq than any journalist I know – and have interviewed countless Iraqis and members of the coalition military.

So I will be very clear what I mean when I say we have won the war. A counterinsurgency is won when the government’s legitimacy is no longer threatened by the insurgents, the government is able to protect its own people and the people are participating in the government. In Iraq, all three conditions apply.

We should keep some troop presence in Iraq to continue supporting the ISF in its peacekeeping mission. There will still be sporadic violence and even spectacular attacks. But I believe that by the end of the year, barring some unexpected setback, even the most ardent war critics will have to admit the obvious: The war is over. We won.

Yon, a former Green Beret, is author of the book “Moment of Truth in Iraq” and writes at www.michaelyon-online.com.

 

The Democrats’ Baghdad Two-Step, (Washington Post)…Peter Hoekstra. July 21, 2008 Pg. 15

It’s hard not to have heard about the positive developments in Iraq lately.

How have Democrats reacted to these developments? Have they reveled in the news that U.S. casualties have plummeted? Have they praised the achievements for which our troops have fought so hard? Have they congratulated the Iraqi government for progress in political reconciliation?

Not exactly.

While there is much still to be done in Iraq, recent events give many reasons for hope. Rather than always focusing on the negative of one front in the battle against radical jihadists, Democratic congressional leaders need to acknowledge success, highlight challenges and lay out a comprehensive long-term strategy to confront, contain and ultimately defeat the threat facing America. Our country cannot be led by naysayers who slide from issue to issue. The responsibilities of leadership go far beyond what Democrats in Congress are demonstrating today.

The writer, a representative from Michigan, is the ranking Republican on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Next-War-Itis: Debate on Strategy

A Pentagon Battle Over ‘The Next War’ (Los Angeles Times)…Julian E. Barnes and Peter Spiegel, July 21, 2008
Pg. 1

Some resist Gates’ focus on guerrilla, not large-scale, fighting.

Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr … like many officers across the military, believes the armed forces must prepare for a large-scale war against technologically sophisticated, well-equipped adversaries, rather than long-term ground conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan.

In public speeches and private meetings, Gates has chastised many commanders as ignoring wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while they plan for speculative future conflicts.

“We should not starve the forces at war today to prepare for a war that may never come,” Gates said in a stinging address last month, one of a series he has delivered. Gates even has coined a term for what he sees as a military disorder: “next-war-itis.”

“I think that nation-state and conventional war is in a state of hibernation,” said Marine Gen. James N. Mattis, who commanded U.S. forces in Fallouja in 2004. “I don’t think it’s gone away, but the most likely threats probably today are not going to be conventional or from another state.”

Mattis argues that the current fight is not an interlude.

In the middle of the debate is Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Mullen has asserted that the military must find a balance between conventional and irregular wars.

The center of gravity in this war has always been the Iraqi people. And when you talk to them, as I have over the past three and a half years, you realize that victory is at hand. They no longer live in fear. Despite sectarian conflicts that are now political rather than military in nature, the feeling of Iraqi nationalism is palpable. Yes, they are Shiites and Sunnis and Kurds, but they are also Iraqis. Just like we are Floridians and New Yorkers, but also Americans.

Leadership: Health Care

Both of the following articles were published in the Indianapolis Star and provide a great example on the adage from Einstein that “We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”  

Define how the stakeholders define quality and you resolve the paradox.

An ounce of prevention saves money and lives. By Bill Corley, July 7, 2008.

Most employers offer health insurance to take care of workers when they get sick. … Five years ago, the health-care company I lead was experiencing double-digit increases in health expenses every year, and that clearly wasn’t sustainable.

That’s when we took a good look at the alternative that keeps them from getting sick in the first place. The results of our wellness efforts have been remarkable, with increased participation and decreased expenses, and the good news is that you don’t have to be in the health-care business to achieve similar results.

The High Cost of Healthy People, by Froma Harrop,

The word “prevention” has a nice ring in any health-care discussion. Thus, many politicians argue that programs to stop smoking, improve diets and otherwise promote wholesome living save money in the long run. A healthier population at less cost —sounds like a win-win situation.

Unfortunately, that formulation is a pleasant fantasy.

Medical economists agree that cancer screenings and gym classes can lead to physical well-being and longer lives. But in the interests of honest accounting, they add that prevention does not reduce overall health-care spending. On the contrary …

Role of a Leader

Leonard Pitts: We know what works; let’s do it. Also published in the Indianapolis Star, July 19, 2008.

This will be the last What Works column.

I reserve the right to report occasionally on any program I run across that shows results in saving the lives and futures of African American kids. But this is the last in the series I started 19 months ago to spotlight such programs.

Indeed, the most important thing I’ve learned is that none of this is rocket science. We already know what works. What we lack is the will to do it.

Instead, we have a hit-and-miss patchwork of programs achieving stellar results out on the fringes of the larger, failing, system. Why are they the exception and not the rule? If we know what works, why don’t we simply do it?

Leaders “job description” is to help “provide the will” to bring about needed improvements.  At the same time, Quality experts such as the late Edwards Deming estimated that the majority of changes result in no improvement.

Quality Leadership provides a better paradigm for helping to ensure that the majority of changes do result in improvement and builds the capability for continually doing what works.

Control over WMD

Trust Still Needs Verification, (Washington Times)…Richard Lugar, July 18, 2008, Pg. 24

Although it escaped most news media attention, the United States received an important bit of good news over the July 4 holiday: Russia’s parliament overwhelmingly approved legislation that enables the United States and Russia to continue their 16-year cooperation to safeguard and destroy the vast Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological weapons arsenal, which to this day remains a danger to both countries.

Quality Leadership and Strategic Thinking

POST: Taking Stock. Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett on July 16, 2008

This posting from Tom Barnett, is one of the many reasons I admire him and his work.  He shares his personal and professional experiences that provide a  “360 view” from an individual perspective.  The personal insight may get us all thinking on the need and challenges involved with balancing our personal, spiritual  and professional lives.

Tom Barnett is also a great example of what I refer to as a Quality Leader that has an intuitive awareness and understanding of the variation principle.  My thesis is that a conscious awareness and understanding of variation will develop more great leaders.

If you notice on most of my posts, I typically capture themes by categories and I sometimes add comments.  It’s kind of an R&D process at this point that I hope will lead to helping me separate the proverbial signals from the noises.  The Top 10 category I am using to capture key concepts. The Taking Stock posting from Tom helps bring out what  I hope is some clarity on strategy and leadership.

Regarding comments in the  posting, on the professional side and from a system and strategy perspective, I think the boundary of any rut for a strategist would be defined by the timeframe of the strategy. The long-term view from a strategic perspective would cover the time humans have been on the planet. Religious leaders typically represent this perspective, e.g., the Episcopalian priest option.

I think the ultimate “living” system/strategic thinker is the Dalai Lama. He thinks in terms of hundred/thousands of years. But he has the advantage in that he recalls past lifetimes so he can build on lessons learned. Interesting to follow his strategy for obtaining autonomy for Tibet. One of China’s counter strategies was to pass a law that attempts to prevent living Buddha’s from reincarnating without permission.

I think the foundation for strategy is represented by the win/lose paradigm. Win/Win being the ideal, e.g, positive thoughts, words, and actions, that benefit everyone. Love captures the concept.  Mother Teresa one of the better examples. Dalai Lama falls into this category as well. The win/lose paradigm is the most prevalent. The lose/lose option represents the ultimate in negative action. Diplomacy/Politics represents the most common example of the win/lose mind-set.

The U.S. Founding fathers captured the ideal/non-ideal concept in the design of our system of government: Ideals of life, liberty, pursuit of happiness combined with a system of checks and balances on power that was designed to be continually improved. On the emergence of our two-part system, the value added by the parties is identifying the polarity on respective issues; the downside is not working together in making progress towards our ideals. American Transformation to Quality Government.

Tom Barnett is a great examples of what I refer to as Quality Leader with an intuitive awareness and understanding of the variation principle.  Quality Leadership is “a” way ahead for developing more great leaders.¼/p>

COPQ: Most important costs …..

Ricochet, (Washington Post)…Warren Zinn, July 13, 2008
Pg. B1

The e-mail was a punch in the gut: “the soldier you made famous — killed himself last Saturday — thought you should know.”

But as I stared at his image on my wall, I couldn’t dodge the question: Did this photo have anything to do with his death? News reports said he hated the celebrity that came with the picture. How much, I wondered, did that moment — just 1/250th of a second when three lives intersected on a river bank in Iraq — contribute to the burdens he’d brought home with him? If I’d never taken his picture, would he have ended up as he did? Would he still have been a casualty of war?

Cost of Power Quality (COPQ):  “Most important costs are unknown and unknowable.”

Vision and Commitment: Berlin, Iraq

We’re Not Leaving… (U.S. News & World Report)…Michael Barone, July 10, 2008.

On June 23, the Soviets cut off land access to West Berli. .

… Secretary of State George Marshall and Joint Chiefs Chairman Omar Bradley, two of America’s most respected generals, felt Berlin was indefensible and we should withdraw. One man disagreed. President Harry Truman, in one crucial meeting after another, said, Were not leaving Berlin.

Just as Truman’s Pentagon opposed the airlift, so George W. Bush’s Pentagon mostly opposed the surge strategy in Iraq.

But Bush, echoing Truman, said, at least in effect, Were not leaving Iraq. He embraced the proposals for the surge, which had been worked up by retired Gen. Jack Keane and American Enterprise Institute scholar Frederick Kagan. He found a commander, Gen. David Petraeus, who had rewritten the Army’s manual on counterinsurgency and who had the character and skill to put the surge into effect.

…The lessons are clear. Stand fast. Put the right men in charge. And never doubt the capacity of the men and women of the American military, when given the right orders, to perform far better than the experts predict.

Army: Learning System, Way Ahead

An Army That Learns
(Washington Post)…David Ignatius, July 13, 2008; Page B07

The U.S. Army has done something remarkable in its new history of the disastrous first 18 months of the American occupation of Iraq: It has conducted a rigorous self-critique of how bad decisions were made, so that the Army won’t make them again.

The study is blunt about how unprepared the Army was for the postwar challenges: “The DOD and the Army lacked a coherent plan to translate the rapid, narrow-front attack [on Baghdad] . . . into strategic success. Soldiers and commanders at nearly every level did not know what was expected of them once Saddam Hussein was deposed and his military forces destroyed.” The situation in spring 2003 “evoked the aphorism, ‘if you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there.’ ”

On Point II  testifies to the Army’s strength as a learning organization. (This study covers May 2003 to January 2005. An earlier volume, “On Point,” chronicled the initial assault on Baghdad.)

Politicians repeat, ad nauseam, the maxim that “those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” The U.S. Army is that rare institution in American life that is actually putting this precept into practice.

The Army is just one component of the national security system, Optimizing all elements of national ower requires a new paradigm.